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INTRODUCTION
ax treaties are peculiar creatures. They are ubiquitous and
familiar, standard and universal. Being among the most
salient building blocks of international economic law, they have
T
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an almost respectable façade. Yet, they are also elusive legal in-
struments and lack a consensus about their true nature and pur-
pose. Tax professionals in some countries apply them on a daily
basis, sometimes as a matter-of-fact, yet others rarely resort to
them. Standard as they are, in some countries tax treaties pro-
vide the core applicable tax norms, whereas in other countries
their effect on tax consequences is marginal.
Complex as they are, nonetheless, tax treaties seem to be very
effective and popular. The network of over three thousand bilat-
eral income tax treaties constructs a rather stable international
tax regime that essentially dictates the tax treatment of a ma-
jority of the cross-border investments in the world.1 Standard
and universal in both substance and geographical coverage, and
having been so for far more than half a decade, they provide the
tax practice with comfort and familiarity that compensate for
the occasional lack of clarity and finality.2
Such stability may, however, not last long. Globalization and
technological changes have challenged the very basics of the re-
gime, leaving it without a good solution for issues such as elec-
tronic commerce, derivative financial instruments, and transfer
pricing, to name a few.3 Further, geopolitical changes have chal-
lenged the dominance of the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) and traditionally rich coun-
tries over the regime.4 Corporations and other non-state organi-
1. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (2000) (ex-
plaining that the international tax regime is constructed around the network
of bilateral tax treaties, essentially all of which are modeled after the OECD
Model Tax Convention). The original acknowledgment of the existence of such
a regime was in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah’s “The Structure of International Taxa-
tion: A Proposal for Simplification.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of In-
ternational Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1349
(1996).
2. See, e.g., THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON
BILATERAL TAX TREATIES (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2012).
3. These pressures have culminated in the Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing (BEPS) project and the acknowledgement of the necessity to reform the
regime. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ADDRESSING BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013).
4. See generally BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
COORDINATION (Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
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zations also grew in power, which required considerations of ac-
tors beyond the states. These changes coincided and put the fu-
ture of tax treaties in jeopardy.
Out of this turmoil arose the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project.5 The project was triggered by public outrage over
aggressive corporate tax planning and was fueled by the media
exposure of such schemes, which mandated the reform of the in-
ternational tax regime.6 Tax treaties, as the building blocks of
such a regime, were required to respond to the challenge and
address their failure to do so before the political mandate.
This article argues that despite the fanfare around it,7 the out-
come of the BEPS project is unlikely to be dramatic, at least in
the short-term. Beyond a period of increased legal uncertainty
and perhaps an atmosphere of more aggressive enforcement by
some countries,8 one should anticipate little substantive change
5. See OECD, supra note 3; ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. [OECD],
ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013); BEPS 2015 Final
Reports, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-2015-final-reports.htm (last
visited June 8, 2016).
6. Initially, the tax-planning schemes of the largest technology corpora-
tions—such as Apple, Microsoft, and Google—were exposed. See Charles
Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, at A1; Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in No-
Tax Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/google-revenues-sheltered-in-no-
tax-bermuda-soar-to-10-billion.html; Richard Waters, Microsoft’s Foreign Tax
Planning Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2011, 2:38 AM),
http://on.ft.com/1Uee9GS. Soon thereafter, however, it became clear that the
phenomenon was more widespread. Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte
Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income Planning, 139 TAX NOTES 1515, 1515
(2013).
7. For an example of such praise, see the OECD’s press release at the clo-
sure of the project. OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for
Discussion at G20 Finance Ministers Meeting, OECD.ORG (May 10, 2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-presents-outputs-of-oecd-g20-beps-project-for-
discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm; see also Lee A. Sheppard,
OECD Head Takes a BEPS Victory Lap, 149 TAXNOTES 340, 340 (2015).
8. One could already observe this change in the audit environment. See,
e.g., Spain - Response to BEPS, KPMG (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2015/10/spain-response-to-
beps.html; C. DAVID SWENSON, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GLOBAL TAX
AUDITS AND DISPUTES: NEW FORCES ARE CONVERGING TO FORM SECOND WAVE,
PWC (2013), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/transfer-pricing/per-
spectives/assets/tpp-globaltaxauditsanddisputes.pdf; William Hoke, Tax Di-
rectors Detail Unconventional Approaches to Transfer Pricing Audits, 80 TAX
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in tax treaties. The challenges to the dominance of the OECD
and the richest countries in the world would likely be assuaged
by marginal concessions, most or all of which do not affect tax
treaties. Yet, this article sees a silver lining in the non-substan-
tive, structural, and instrumental outcomes of the BEPS project.
It argues that, even if unintended, these outcomes, including the
multilateral instrument, the compact to intensify the use of ar-
bitration, and the standardization of transfer-pricing reporting,
will have the most meaningful impact on tax treaties, their con-
tent, and the future of the international tax regime.
Part I of the article begins with an exposure of the current
state of the international tax regime and the unanswered chal-
lenges that threaten to destabilize it. Part II analyzes the place
of the BEPS project in the evolution of the regime. Part III as-
sesses the impact of BEPS on the future of tax treaties and the
international tax regime. The article then concludes.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME: CRYSTALLIZATION AND
DISINTEGRATION
The current international tax regime is comprised of over
three thousand bilateral tax treaties that govern the taxation of
the large majority of cross-border business and investment.9
These treaties are meaningfully standard. Scholars estimate
that around 75 percent of the language of all tax treaties is taken
from a single source: the OECD Model Tax Convention on In-
come and on Capital (“OECD Model”).10 The OECD Model dom-
inates the current tax treaty law.11
The standardization of international tax law is not confined,
however, to tax treaty law. Since (at least) the post-WWII period,
NOTES INT’L 409, 409 (2015); Raymond Doherty, Companies Fear BEPS “Tax
Chaos,” ECONOMIA (May 13, 2014), http://economia.icaew.com/news/may-
2014/companies-fear-beps-tax-chaos.
9. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1.
10. The OECD Model has been amended from time to time. See THE IMPACT
OF THEOECD ANDUNMODELCONVENTIONS ONBILATERALTAXTREATIES, supra
note 2.
11. Id.
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international tax laws of essentially all countries have signifi-
cantly converged.12 Such convergence occurred not only in in-
come taxes, on which this article focuses, but also more generally
in fiscal devices and policies.13 Much of this convergence can be
attributed to tax treaties and their standardization,14 yet some
of it relates to norms that are merely tangential or unrelated to
treaty norms.15
Such standardization, however, has not amounted to much
harmonization. An international tax regime has emerged but is
based primarily on soft law.16 The convergence has attracted
some scholars to examine whether this regime has reached a
customary international law status.17 Such a conclusion, how-
ever, has not yet been reached and remains primarily a desirable
goal for some. Numerous differences among tax laws still exist,
many of which are difficult to rationalize.18 Some of these differ-
ences have facilitated the type of aggressive corporate tax plan-
ning that triggered the launch of the BEPS project.19 A funda-
mental insight of BEPS was that countries could not proceed to
make completely independent tax policies because of the inter-
dependence of their economies.20 It is difficult for countries to act
12. See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56
TAX L. REV. 259, 266 (2003).
13. A more general review of this convergence is, however, beyond the scope
of this article and will have to wait for another occasion.
14. The most salient example of this phenomenon is perhaps the almost uni-
versal use of the permanent establishment (“PE”) concept for the taxation of
business income of foreigners.
15. The almost universal convergence of source rules is one example of this
phenomenon. See Brauner, supra note 12, at 278–82.
16. See Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxa-
tion, 25 WISC. INT’L L.J. 325, 331 (2007); Diane Ring, Who is Making Interna-
tional Tax Policy?: International Organizations as Power Players in a High
Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT’LL.J. 649, 652 (2010); Hugh J. Ault, Reflections
on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 757 (2009); Jose M. Calderón, The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
as a Source of Tax Law: Is Globalization Reaching the Tax Law?, 35 INTERTAX
4 (2007); Alberto Vega, International Governance Through Soft Law: The Case
of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TransState, Working Paper No. 163,
2012), http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000E-78E6-3.
17. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAXREGIME (2007).
18. See generally Brauner, supra note 12.
19. See supra text accompanying note 6.
20. See Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014).
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quickly on this insight and enhance coordination of their tax pol-
icies since, at its core, the international tax regime is designed
to enhance competition, not cooperation among tax jurisdictions.
A. The Competition-Based International Tax Regime
The current international tax regime is firmly constructed
around a competition framework. Obviously, it is not institution-
alized;21 it includes no strong supranational norms, if any; it
does not have a mandatory dispute resolution device;22 and, by
design, legal action taken pursuant to the regime is decisively
unilateral and not cooperative.23 This should not be surprising
since the world’s strongest economic powers and enthusiasts of
market theory, following the so-called “Washington Consensus,”
were instrumental in constructing the regime.24 The interna-
tional tax regime evolved with the apparent sole aim to perfect
such competition rather than curb it. Unsurprisingly, it re-
mained a soft legal regime with no established international fo-
rum or supranational and evolving body of law. Some reputable
21. The international tax regime remains noninstitutional despite attempts
to advocate such institutionalization. See, e.g., Frances M. Horner, DoWe Need
an International Tax Organization, 24 TAX NOTES INT’L 179 (2001); Brauner,
supra note 12, at 265–91.
22. Even the recommended mandatory arbitration procedures have not yet
been included in the OECD Model. A renewed attempt to promote the idea by
the BEPS project garnered support of only twenty developed states. See infra
text accompanying note 31.
23. This is true even in the application of the transfer-pricing rules that
regulate cross-border intra-firm transactions. Such transactions always con-
cern at least two jurisdictions, yet the norm is for each jurisdiction to regulate
the “transfer price” as it affects the income of “its” taxpayer, regardless of what
the other jurisdiction does. Bilateral and multilateral rulings on these matters,
known as advanced pricing agreements, seem natural in this context, yet they
are rare.
24. The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson in a
1989 summary of ten key development-advice items commonly shared by the
Washington, D.C. institutions—the International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and U.S. Treasury Department. In its original context, it served as ad-
vice to Latin American countries following the 1980s crisis. See John William-
son, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN
READJUSTMENT: HOWMUCHHASHAPPENED 7 (JohnWilliamson ed., 1989). This
advice later became the symbol of what is often called market fundamentalism.
For a reflection on the evolution of the term and its symbolism, see AFTER THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: RESTARTING GROWTH AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
(Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski & John Williamson eds., 2003).
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scholars have disputed the mere existence of the regime, or per-
haps the utility of referring to it as such, based on its continuous
and conspicuous “softness.”25
Following this agenda, the academic analysis of the interna-
tional tax regime has also been dominated by the perceived bi-
nary choice between competition and harmonization.26 Since no
one seriously wished for a global tax government, and surely no
one believed that countries would agree to it, harmonization was
generally rejected outright.27 Consequently, the regime stuck to
reliance on competition, primarily based on the unquestioned be-
lief in the invisible forces behind markets and their vague wel-
fare-maximization properties.28 A more sophisticated support of
competition as a basis for the international tax regime developed
on political distrust of cooperation at the international level.29
Such an approach views even the current, soft regime as an in-
fluential cartel that services the more powerful countries at the
expense of less powerful countries.30 Yet, the core of this critique
is its distrust of the OECD, the club of rich countries that has
been the caretaker of the international tax regime.31 The OECD
25. H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International
Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137 (1999).
26. See Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L LAW&POL.
939 (2000); Tsilly Dagan, The Costs of International Tax Cooperation, in
GLOBALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 49 (E. Benvenisti, G. Nolte, & D.
Barak-Erez eds., 2002); Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspec-
tive on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001).
27. See Brauner, supra note 12, at 259–62.
28. See Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, supra note 26.
29. Tsilly Dagan, BRICS: Theoretical Framework and the Potential of Coop-
eration, in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION
15 (Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
30. Id.
31. A good example of the importance of this distrust is the fate of manda-
tory arbitration that has been promoted by the OECD and the United Nations
for over a decade, yet caught little traction beyond a few treaties among exclu-
sively rich countries. This remains the case despite the supposed advantage
that mandatory arbitration presents to developing countries that cannot out-
power rich countries in the current treaty mutual agreement procedure
(“MAP”). It is a common opinion that developing countries expect mandatory
arbitration to advantage the rich countries since they expect appropriate arbi-
trators to originate almost exclusively from the developed world. The renewed
promotion of mandatory arbitration in BEPS has not fared much better. The
implementation commitment includes approximately twenty countries as of
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dominates the regime through its exclusive powers over the
OECD Model, which permits it to set the agenda for all develop-
ments of the regime. Yet, more fundamentally, the norms con-
tained in the OECD Model are biased in favor of residence taxa-
tion that benefits wealthier countries, such as the OECD mem-
ber states.32 Any further harmonization, as the claim goes,
would have to be based on this bias, further fixating the domi-
nance of the rich countries over all others.
Critics of the competition framework respond that it assures
the dominance of the rich countries and their control over the
international tax regime.33 Thus, further competition would not
give a voice to the less powerful economies that do not compete
on a level playing field with the rich countries and among them-
selves. The competition framework limits policy choices that
may assist developing countries to grow, develop, and even col-
lect sufficient revenue to sustain their policies. Only cooperation
at some level would allow these countries to make free and ra-
tional policy choices.34 This approach may be based on general
notions of fairness or equity, yet it may also be based on interests
that may be mutual to both developed and developing (produc-
tive) countries, all of which suffer from poor revenue collection.35
Such revenue loss may be found in inappropriate tax planning
that uses non-productive, so-called “tax haven,” jurisdictions to
benefit few people at the eventual expense of many others.36 The
BEPS project reflects a realization that more coordination, and
January 2016, yet, none of them is a developing country. The non-OECD G20
countries that partnered with the OECD in BEPS have all clearly abandoned
this route. See ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. [OECD],MAKINGDISPUTE
RESOLUTIONMECHANISMSMORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 41
(2015) [hereinafter ACTION 14 FINAL REPORT].
32. But see Ekkehart Reimer, 5 + 7 = Odd, A Plea for More Consistency Be-
tween the PE Definition and Profit Allocation Rules in the OECD Model Tax
Convention, FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing for excessive conces-
sions by the OECD in favor of so-called source countries).
33. See Brauner, supra note 12, at 307–08.
34. Id. at 308.
35. See id.
36. As predicted by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globaliza-
tion, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1573 (2000).
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even some harmonization, may be beneficial to both developed
and developing countries.37
B. A Disintegration of the International Tax Regime?
While crystallizing, several recent developments have posed
challenges to the international tax regime, adding to the diffi-
culties it faces. Recent geopolitical changes have been particu-
larly important in this regard. The general criticism of the
OECD and its dominance over the international tax regime
sharpened as some of the developing countries that are not mem-
bers of the OECD began emerging and establishing both eco-
nomic and political dominance.38 Most notably, the countries of
Brazil, Russia, India, China and the Republic of South Africa
(“BRICS”), led by India and China, gained strong positions in the
global market and began demanding a corresponding voice in
the policymaking process.39 The OECD anticipated the im-
portance of communicating with non-member states long before
these developments and launched an observation program for
such countries.40 Yet, the power to observe proceedings was not
sufficient for countries that started viewing themselves as world
leaders, especially when, for most purposes, their participation
did not result in significant enough changes (subjectively) in the
division of tax bases and other norms.41 The demand for more
source taxation conflicted with the opposite trend to eliminate
37. SeeOECD, supra note 3.
38. See Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, Introduction, in BRICS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 3–4 (Yariv Brauner &
Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
39. Id.
40. The initiative, originally named the Special Centre for Co-operation
with Non-Members, is now under the “Global Relations in Taxation” heading.
See Global Relations in Taxation, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-
global/ (last visited June 19, 2016).
41. For example, China lost the battle over locational savings, yet continued
to pursue it under domestic laws despite its rejection by the BEPS project. See,
e.g., Ryan Finley, Panel Expects Increased Transfer Pricing Compliance Bur-
dens, 80 TAXNOTES INT’L 488, 489 (2015). India could not achieve finalization
or any recommendations regarding action item 1 and the taxation of the digital
economy. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ADDRESSING THE
TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT
(2015) [hereinafter ACTION 1 FINAL REPORT].
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source taxation in favor of residence-based taxation that had al-
ways been the hallmark of OECD tax policy and a consequence
of the competition framework of the international tax regime.42
Some countries have unilaterally departed from some of the
prior universal norms of the international tax regime to assert
their tax jurisdiction and views of appropriate division of tax ba-
ses.43
At the same time, past economic powers have lost some or, in
other instances, most of their power (in the case of the United
States it lost its superpower). Today, even the United States can-
not dominate any international tax policy discussion alone.44
Globalization and the 2008 financial crisis caused a thirst for
revenue among even the most developed countries, which then
lacked the capacity to regenerate their collection powers inde-
pendently.45
The first response to this crisis focused on collection and the
most traditional and conservative tax treaty measure of infor-
mation exchange.46 The thought was that enhanced and inex-
pensive exchange of information, coupled with the destruction of
42. See, e.g., Reimer, supra note 32.
43. Finley, supra note 41, at 488. Another example includes the renewed
collection demand of Vodafone by India following the litigation regarding In-
dia’s exceptional taxation (from OECD norms) of indirect share transfers.
Stephanie Soong Johnston, India Renews $2.1 Billion Vodafone Tax Demand,
81 TAXNOTES INT’L 650, 651 (2016).
44. Examples for this loss of power could be the inability of the United
States to have the BEPS project recommend the inclusion of controlled foreign
corporation (“CFC”) measures under action item 3. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN
COMPANY RULES, ACTION 3 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 3
FINAL REPORT]; Ryan Finley, The Year in BEPS: Phase 1 Completed, 80 TAX
NOTES INT’L 983, 985 (2015). Another such example is the very limited response
to the most important item on the U.S. list in BEPS: mandatory arbitration.
See ACTION 14 FINAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 41.
45. Hence, the BEPS project. The one possible exception to this may be the
U.S. ability to implement its domestic Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA) legislations and essentially force the rest of the world to cooperate
with its collection efforts. Yet, this may be a minor exception if one notes that
FATCA may be convenient for foreign tax authorities in their own pursuit of
aggressive collection and would lay the political blame at the feet of the United
States.
46. MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 26 (ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2010) [hereinafter OECD MODEL CONVENTION
2010].
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bank secrecy, would eliminate most abusive tax planning and
restore the power of the old international tax regime. Yet, the
nature of the global market of information and contemporary tax
planning prevented rich economies from implementing this so-
lution alone. The power effectively shifted in part to the Group
of Twenty (G20) organization, which includes some OECD mem-
bers as well as emerging economies that do not belong to the
OECD but have an equal voice to that of the traditional powers
in the G20.47 The outcome was the “Global Forum.”48 The BEPS
project was the next step wherein the G20 took initiative, even
if in cooperation with the OECD, following the pattern of the
Global Forum.49
The same phenomena resulted in not only political challenges
to the international tax regime but also direct challenges to the
efficacy of the norms. “New” economic trends, including the as-
cent of electronic commerce, intangibles, sophisticated financial
instruments in global capital markets, and multinational enter-
prises (“MNEs”) facilitated by globalization, have all dumb-
founded the prevailing norms that have been established for a
simpler, “smaller,” brick-and-mortar world. For many of these
transactions, the norms became apparently inadequate, as did
the structural foundations of the international tax regimes, such
as the dichotomy between source and residence. These chal-
lenges to the norms of the regime have tested the efficacy of tax
treaties and their future as the foundation of the regime. They
also further exposed the already existing and perhaps inherent
weaknesses of tax treaties.
47. See Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: Why BEPS is Just the Beginning,
79 TAXNOTES INT’L 983 (2015).
48. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ (last visited Mar.
1, 2016) [hereinafter Global Forum on Transparency]. Note, however, that in
practice, the forum is heavily influenced by the richest countries and relies on
the OECD politically and administratively.
49. Some have even identified a pattern in the G20’s actions on tax. See, e.g.,
Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137
(2016). This pattern is too tentative and misleading since, as explained here,
the leading OECD economies and the OECD itself have been the primary win-
ners from BEPS in this context.
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C. The Nature and Purpose of Tax Treaties
In construction, shocks and crises often expose cracks in the
foundation. This is clearly true for tax treaties in recent times.
This is also a good occasion for an inquiry into the nature and
purpose of tax treaties. Such an inquiry has rarely been made
since tax treaties are viewed as instrumental devices for the di-
vision of tax bases among countries. A reference to the “avoid-
ance of double taxation” is often made as an immediate response
to any question about the purpose of tax treaties. This reference
has a strong backing in the history of tax treaties developed
among neighboring jurisdictions to resolve border-related tax ju-
risdiction conflicts.50 Furthermore, the origins of the tax treaty
project—found in the work of the 1920s League of Nations—can
also be traced to the desire to facilitate cross-border trade and
investment.51 The basic idea was simply to eliminate tax barri-
ers that result from conflicting claims, mainly those based on
source on the one hand and residence on the other hand. The
actual division of the tax base did not (and still does not) follow
any recognizable policy principle. It was constructed from a
patchwork of norms that followed efficiency-based observations,
perceived fairness, and other legitimacy-based constructs. Thus,
a source country could only tax income generated by a foreign
person with significant presence within its jurisdiction, yet it re-
ceived essentially a free pass to tax income related to real prop-
erty located within its jurisdiction. Appropriate here is an obser-
vation by Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, quoted in
the influential Vogel book on tax treaties: “[T]he concessions are
more likely to be based on bargaining than on sound principles
of taxation.”52
50. See Sunita Jogarajan, Stamp, Seligman and the Drafting of the 1923
Experts’ Report on Double Taxation, 5 WORLD TAX J. 368 (2013) (exposing the
history of the League of Nations tax treaty work and the centrality of double
taxation to this work); see also A. J. VAN DEN TEMPEL, RELIEF FROM DOUBLE
TAXATION (1967) (extending the analysis to the takeover of the tax treaty pro-
ject from the League of Nations by the OECD); Richard J. Vann, Writing Tax
Treaty History 12–13 (Sydney Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 10/19, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788603.
51. See Jogarajan, supra note 50; Report on Double Taxation Submitted to
the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Jo-
siah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73.F.19 (1923).
52. KLAUS VOGEL, KLAUS VOGEL ON DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS: A
COMMENTARY TO THE OECD, UN, AND US MODEL CONVENTIONS FOR THE
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The commitment to eliminate double taxation itself, however,
is limited. First, there is controversy over what constitutes dou-
ble taxation.53 This may not be important in most cases of tax
treaty interpretation since treaty provisions do not include a di-
rect reference to this concept. Rather, they reference an instru-
mental rule with, perhaps, the effect of double tax elimination.
Second, treaties generally eliminate juridical rather than eco-
nomic double taxation (i.e., they are concerned with the tech-
nical rather than the actual incidence of taxation54). Finally,
treaties explicitly do not eliminate all double taxation. There are
various situations that treaties cannot resolve and these situa-
tions are simply left unresolved, leaving tax authorities to ad-
dress them eventually, or not.55
An important issue concerns multiparty transactions that ex-
tend beyond two jurisdictions that are parties to a tax treaty (of-
ten called “triangular situations”). Most of these remain beyond
the reach of current treaty law because they are bilateral.56
While the limited scope of tax treaties may be viewed as one of
their strengths, because they address only resolvable cases
where possible, in recent years it has become a more significant
limitation. Globalization and the rise of MNEs naturally make
most global trade multilateral rather than bilateral, and the bi-
lateral nature of tax treaties has become more of a liability than
an advantage as a result.
A similar development challenges a second, and perhaps, orig-
inally inferior purpose of tax treaties, phrased as the combat of
fiscal evasion. This purpose was satisfied primarily by a provi-
sion that loosely obligated the parties to exchange relevant tax
information among them.57 Later developments added a weak
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL, WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TOGERMAN TREATY PRACTICE 4 (3d. ed. 1997).
53. Id.
54. U.N. Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Note on the
Revision of the Manual for Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties U.N. Doc.
E/C.18/2011/CRP.11 (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/seventhses-
sion/CRP11_Introduction_2011.pdf.
55. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMMENTARIES ON THE
ARTICLES OF THEMODELTAXCONVENTION arts. 23A, 23B, para. 32 (2010) [here-
inafter OECDCOMMENTARIES].
56. See EMILY FETT, TRIANGULAR CASES: THE APPLICATION OF BILATERAL
INCOME TAX TREATIES INMULTILATERAL SITUATIONS (2014).
57. OECD MODELCONVENTION 2010, supra note 46, art. 26.
2016] Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS 987
commitment to assist in the collection of taxes and a loose
matching of policies among the parties.58 With the turn of the
millennium, the term double non-taxation was coined to
strengthen this corollary function of tax treaties.59 Accepting
that the international tax regime wishes to follow a single tax
principle, parties permitted a regime based on a general senti-
ment: to avoid overburdening cross-border investors and create
incentives based on tax law to invest abroad.60 This principle ap-
peals not only to the common sense and equitable view of the
regime but also to supporters of the competition-based frame-
work since such a principle may also be read as an efficiency-
enhancing, neutrality-promoting principle. The problem is the
language and the perceived metaphor since double taxation and
double non-taxation naturally sound like parallel, mirror prob-
lems, especially when based on a single principle. Yet, pragmat-
ically, they represent very different challenges and difficulties in
implementation.61 Governments were attracted by this articula-
tion, identifying new opportunities to use tax treaties to support
their collection and enforcement efforts. Consequently, the
OECD identified this as an opportunity to enhance its influence
58. One such example is the claw-back exemption with progression, where
one country imposes its tax rates based not only on the income associated with
its jurisdiction but rather based on the worldwide income of the taxpayer, for
example, the calculation of which requires information available typically only
through cooperation with its treaty partner or partners.
59. The main milestone in the launch of double non-taxation as a corollary
to double taxation is probably its choice as a main issue in the 2004 Interna-
tional Fiscal Association congress in Vienna. See Int’l Fiscal Assoc., 89a
CAHIERS DEDROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL (2004).
60. For a review of the evolution of the single tax principle, see Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah,Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of
US Treaty Policy (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 318, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226309. For the
original exposition of the single tax principle as a fundamental pillar of the
international tax regime, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997).
61. For more information, see my critique of BEPS action item 2 (Hybrid
Mismatches). See Yariv Brauner, The Bad, the Worse, and the Ugly, in BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): IMPACT FOR OECD AND EU TAX POLICY
(Robert Danon ed., 2016).
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on the international tax regime. In a way, the whole BEPS pro-
ject is about double non-taxation and its introduction into the
international tax regime.62
An additional view of tax treaties emphasizes their role as
comity mechanisms, similar to membership cards in a club of
proper jurisdictions.63 The mere existence of a tax treaty seems
to send a signal of normalcy and relative safety for investment.
Tax treaties also institutionalize lines of communication be-
tween tax authorities on both bilateral and multilateral levels,
and in some cases legitimize such discourse in fiscal rather than
diplomatic channels. Finally, tax treaties present opportunities
to amend tax laws in a manner that avoids domestic politics. Tax
treaties provide flexibility for the executive branch and add an
additional layer of checks and balances, albeit with a democratic
deficit.
This view accepts the imperfections of tax treaties on both
fronts (double taxation and double non-taxation). It further ac-
cepts that such goals may be met without tax treaties in loose
coordination arrangements or even on a unilateral basis.64 Such
a view better explains the role of tax treaties in the construction
of the international tax regime than that of their traditional and
allegedly instrumental purposes. Additionally, it accounts for
the continuous desire of countries to enter into tax treaties with-
out careful accounting for their straightforward costs and bene-
fits.65
62. A more detailed discussion of this concept will be covered in the next
section.
63. Brauner, supra note 12, at 292.
64. See Dagan, Tax Treaties Myth, supra note 26.
65. Note that the economic literature on tax treaties is divided regarding
their desirability as investment enhancers. See Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B.
Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity (Univ. of Or.,
Econ. Working Paper No. 2001-14, 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=445980;
Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment
(Univ. of Or., Econ. Working Paper No. 2003-14, 2001), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=436502; Peter Egger, The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on For-
eign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence, 39 CAN. J. ECON. 901 (2006); Eric
Neumayer, Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries?, 43 J. DEV. STUD. 1495 (2007).
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II. BEPS
With much fanfare, the OECD announced the launch of the
BEPS project in 2013.66 Its excitement, as well as the optimism
of most stakeholders, has since waned,67 yet the intensity of the
work on the project and its impact have not. International tax
policy is still as hot a topic in 2016 as it was in 2012 or 2013.
This may be surprising for some since, at its core, BEPS is a po-
litical project. G20 politicians initiated the project in response to
a public outrage over some large corporations’ use of tax-plan-
ning schemes, which subsequently was fueled by the media’s in-
terest and exposure of these schemes.68 Interestingly, the OECD
was charged with fixing the problem, and fixing it quickly.69 This
is the same OECD organization that had been the caretaker of
the international tax regime during the last half century and, in
some ways, may be viewed as responsible for the problem it was
charged with fixing.
Yet, for the OECD, this presented an opportunity in the form
of political support for reform that had always been difficult to
garner. The opportunity was, however, also fraught with chal-
lenges. First, the political charge was not accompanied by clear
guidance about the goals and purposes of the project. On the one
hand, it was clear that schemes of the sorts exposed by the media
as having the effect of BEPS should have been addressed.70 On
the other hand, a more comprehensive reform would have been
required to prevent different schemes from replacing them.71
66. See OECD, supra note 3. The G20 Leaders Declaration of September
2013 provided the expanded political mandate enjoyed by the OECD. Group of
Twenty [G-20], St. Petersburg Summit Leaders’ Declaration (Sept. 5–6, 2013),
https://www.g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Saint_Petersburg_Decla-
ration_ENG.pdf. The mandate followed the Los Cabos declaration launching
the project. See Group of Twenty [G-20], Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declara-
tion ¶ 48 (June 18–19 2012), https://g20.org.tr/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/12/G20_Leaders_Declaration_Final_Los_Cabos_0.pdf.
67. Take, for example, the United States. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Anal-
ysis: BEPS Progress Report, 142 TAX NOTES 1154, 1154 (2014) (“Remember,
BEPS is a European project. It is EU governments beating up on U.S. multi-
nationals . . . .”); Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: The U.S. Treasury and the
BEPS Mess, 78 TAXNOTES INT’L 1067 (2015).
68. See supra text accompanying note 6.
69. Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declaration, supra note 66, ¶ 48.
70. Action items 2, 6, and 8–10 may be viewed as focusing on these transac-
tions. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 5, at 15–20.
71. Thus, action items 3, 6, 8–10, 13, and 15, in particular. Id. at 16–24.
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Such reform would have been necessary regardless of BEPS due
to other imminent needs, such as the ascent of the digital econ-
omy, the ineffectiveness of the transfer-pricing rules, and the
rise of emerging economies.
Second, the OECD tax work, especially the maintenance of the
OECD Model, positioned the organization as the absolute leader
or caretaker of the international tax regime. Yet, such mainte-
nance requires political will that is often deficient to constantly
reform and adapt the model to the changing circumstances, such
as globalization and crises. The political will granted in the
BEPS context presented an opportunity to promote reform that
would have been otherwise difficult. At the same time, the lead-
ing OECD countries had all been struggling with economic crises
and difficulties to collect much needed revenue. Consequently,
BEPS provided the OECD with both an opportunity to
strengthen its position but also a challenge to ensure revenue
collection by the world’s richest economies.
Third, the timing of BEPS, perhaps not accidentally, coincided
with dramatic geopolitical shifts of power directly affecting the
OECD in general and its position as a leader in the design of
international tax policy in particular. The rise of the large
emerging economies, most notably BRICS, caused these coun-
tries to demand a voice in the policymaking process (including
tax policy). This, of course, is not new: the OECD had granted
some of these countries, most notably China and India, the right
to participate as observers in its tax policy-making meetings.72
Yet, in the BEPS context, BRICS countries have a similar status
as leading OECD members because the BRICS are equal mem-
bers in the G20, which includes some but not all OECD mem-
bers. This is a new and likely source of contention, especially on
matters that consistently divide developed and developing coun-
tries. What is clear is that source jurisdictions should benefit un-
der BEPS from an increased share of tax bases, yet the extent of
the benefit and how to fit the shift into a coherent reform of the
international tax regime remains far from clear.
Against this complex background, the OECD devised a diverse
action plan with a (now well-known) list of fifteen specific action
72. For a complete list of OECD membership and affiliations, see Members
and Partners, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/
(last visited June 9, 2016) (listing nations with OECD membership).
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items.73 The plan is not cohesive, yet, together with the original
OECD BEPS report, one could identify three basic insights it
provides.74 The first, and most important insight for the pur-
poses of this article, is that international coordination of tax pol-
icies is a condition for the success of any substantial reform; and,
therefore, unilateral action, regardless of its substance, cannot
succeed by definition. This insight stands in stark contrast to the
most fundamental basis of our current competition-based inter-
national tax regime. It is clear that such desired coordination
has to include non-OECD countries, which would at least chal-
lenge the dominance of this organization over the international
tax regime.
A second insight of the BEPS project relates to the importance
of comprehensive and holistic reform rather than ad hoc, partial
reforms that have been typical of the regime. Note that the
OECD could not generally be blamed for past practices in this
context since this was clearly a consequence of political will be-
yond its control. Nonetheless, despite the rhetoric, OECD per-
sonnel have bluntly ignored this insight throughout the project,
in both public statements and in their reports, preferring “prag-
matic” and specific “solutions” and avoiding principles.75
A third insight of the BEPS project is that there are certain
challenges that have been underestimated and dealt with in tra-
ditional means, usually by analogy to old-economy issues.76 It is
clear that many of these challenges require a different approach
that includes innovation. The most dramatic signal about this
insight is the willingness to slaughter the holiest of cows and go
“beyond” arm’s length in transfer-pricing practices.77 In reality,
BEPS has failed to innovate beyond the new transfer-pricing re-
porting rules and, perhaps, in the initiative to establish a multi-
lateral instrument.
73. Id.
74. See Yariv Brauner, BEPS: An Interim Evaluation, 6 WORLD TAX J. 1, 12
(2014).
75. See, e.g., Pascal Saint-Amans, The OECD Work on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting, YOUTUBE (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9VhFGU5mvI (discussing the Centre for
Tax Policy and Administration and the OECD’s work on BEPS).
76. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ARE THE
CURRENT TREATY RULES FOR TAXING BUSINESS PROFITS APPROPRIATE FOR E-
COMMERCE? 18 (2004).
77. See OECD, supra note 3, at 45.
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Interim analyses of the BEPS project determined that it has
failed to adhere to its basic insights.78 In particular, treaty-re-
lated issues suffered a lack of progress. This article next engages
in a concise, final report on the outcomes of BEPS, as the project
winds down, in order to assess the project’s impact on the future
of tax treaties.
A. A Concise (and Almost) Final Report on the BEPS Action
Plan
This section briefly reviews the goals of each of the plan’s ac-
tion items compared with their achievements. One should real-
ize that most action items require additional work before they
can be implemented, if at all; others resulted in no operative rec-
ommendations.
1. Action Item 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital
Economy
Action item 1 required a report discussing the challenges
posed by the digital economy to the current international tax re-
gime, which was never designed for it.79 The regime failed to
adapt to technological progress and to the ascent of intangibles,
as it merely tweaked the rules80 in an apparently unsatisfacto-
rily manner to fit these developments.81 The BEPS context was
obvious since MNEs, whose use of tax-planning schemes trig-
gered the launch of the BEPS project, all have heavily relied on
78. See Brauner, supra note 74, at 38; Sheppard, supra note 67.
79. See, e.g., Chang Hee Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax
Revenue Between Developed and Developing Countries, 4 J. KOREAN L., no. 1,
2004, at 19, 21 (“[D]igital technology completely destroys the economic and le-
gal basis for the existing rules of international taxation, implying the necessity
of a complete overhaul . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 76, at 54; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. [OECD], E-COMMERCE: TRANSFER PRICING AND BUSINESS PROFITS
TAXATION 113 (2005). The most significant outcomes of this work were the
changes to Article 5 in the OECD Commentary on the Model Tax Convention,
resulting in the addition of paragraphs 42.1–42.10. OECD COMMENTARIES, su-
pra note 55, art. 5, para. 42.1–42.10.
81. This is evidenced by the OECD identifying the “[a]pplication of treaty
concepts to profits derived from the delivery of digital goods and services” as a
key pressure area that must be addressed by the BEPS project, later reflected
in action item 1. See OECD, supra note 3, at 47.
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intangibles in exploiting the tax advantages of an imperfectly
regulated digital economy.82
The goal of this item was modest: the generation of a report.
In fact, the OECD quickly understood that more than that was
required. Consequently, the OECD focused on a few reasonable
solutions for the most important issues at stake. The final action
item 1 report acknowledges the need for post-BEPS monitoring
and seems to state that the digital economy taskforce will con-
tinue to exist for implementation and monitoring purposes.83 It
is unclear, however, whether meaningful action will be taken on
any of the issues discussed. Action was taken regarding con-
sumption taxes, and a plan for implementation is in play,84 yet
no operative steps are planned in the income tax area.
The final report mentions three possible income tax measures
available for countries to adopt, yet it does not recommend (nor
does it strictly oppose) them: (i) nexus-based taxation,85 (ii) a
withholding tax on digital transactions,86 and (iii) an equaliza-
tion levy. The report asserts that other BEPS measures should
ameliorate the pressure created by the digital economy on tax
enforcement, rendering special measures unnecessary. The
OECD failed, however, to explain how that would occur or which
operative norms would so govern. No accountability or monitor-
ing measures were provided or discussed.
82. See supra text accompanying note 6.
83. Yet, no final recommendations have been furnished and no practical ac-
tion has been taken to actually establish a follow-up forum in the same manner
already done regarding other items, such as the consumption tax aspects of
action items 1, 14, and 15. See ACTION 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 41, at 13;
ACTION 14 FINAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 37–41; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO
MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, ACTION 15 - 2015 FINALREPORT (2015) [here-
inafter ACTION 15 FINAL REPORT].
84. Consumption tax implications of BEPS are beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle.
85. Peter Hongler & Pasquale Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to
Tax Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy 2 (Int’l Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation, Working Paper No. 20, 2015), ssrn.com/abstract=2586196.
86. See Yariv Brauner & Andres Baez Moreno, Withholding Taxes in the
Service of BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy
(WU Int’l Taxation Research, Paper No. 2015-14, 2015), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2591830; see also Richard Doernberg, Electronic Commerce and Inter-
national Tax Sharing, 16 TAXNOTES INT’L 1013 (1998).
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This is a very conservative move by the OECD. It clearly ig-
nores the necessity of innovation that is the third insight of
BEPS. It says: “Yes, we acknowledge our failure to date, but,
trust us, now we are really going to get it right.” Realistically,
the OECD probably anticipated the lack of progress on the mat-
ter due to the vow of BEPS for consensus. In the case of the dig-
ital economy, consensus meant stagnation.
Yet, inaction might be undesirable for the stability of the in-
ternational tax regime, even when disagreements run deep. Sev-
eral countries do not trust the OECD on this matter. These coun-
tries have already enacted a variety of unilateral measures.87
This may leave other countries with little choice but to follow.
The adoption of these measures, again, will be uncoordinated
and contrary to the first insight of BEPS. The lack of commit-
ment to solving the issues through the OECD would then make
matters worse, not better. It is of course possible that some coun-
tries would coordinate a new set of standard rules for the taxa-
tion of the digital economy outside of the OECD. This would be
consistent with BEPS, yet success in such action would be a tall
order without the infrastructure of the BEPS project in place,
and realistically, one cannot see any indication that that is likely
to happen. Defensive, unilateral action based on rough justice
and vague guidance to taxpayers is much more likely to occur in
the short-term.
The impact of this action item on tax treaties will be miniscule.
Yet, countries adopting a nexus-based solution may change their
Article 5 definitions, effectively following a “digital PE” route.88
87. See, e.g., Italy Considers Introduction of Tax on Digital Activities, EY
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-
Tax/Alert—Italy-considers-introduction-of-tax-on-digital-activities; The Latest
on BEPS, EY (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs-
sets/Alert:_The_Latest_on_BEPS_-
_27_April_2015/$FILE/2015G_CM5405_The%20Latest%20on%20BEPS%20-
%2027%20April%202015.pdf.
88. PE has become the universal norm for taxation of business income
earned by foreign taxpayers in host countries. The norm is that only perma-
nent business activities in terms of both place and time may be taxed by such
host (or “source”) countries. Such permanence must be manifested by both peo-
ple on the ground and a physical element such as bricks, walls, etc. This rule
is viewed as anachronistic in the digital age since very significant business
may be done (in the colloquial sense) without having the abovementioned phys-
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Countries refusing such solutions will have to deal with the
eventual double taxation claims at the mutual agreement proce-
dure level and, perhaps, claims of treaty overrides as well. The
challenge of the digital economy will not simply go away. The
failure of BEPS to achieve progress in this context made things
worse for all stakeholders.
2. Action Item 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Ar-
rangements
Action item 2 addresses hybrid mismatch arrangements, the
very essence of BEPS. Hybrid mismatch arrangements are tax-
planning schemes that exploit differences between the laws of
the jurisdictions involved to minimize taxation in an inappropri-
ate manner. What is inappropriate in this context? Taxpayers
cannot be blamed for organizing their affairs in manners that
take advantage of mere differences in tax laws, as this is the
essence of all tax planning, and even further, some of these dif-
ferences are clearly intentional. Indeed, some of these differ-
ences are part of tax competition that is at the core of the inter-
national tax regime. Moreover, even the little bit of coordination
provided by tax treaties is manifestly incomplete. There are
many instances of double taxation not resolved by tax treaty
norms because the competing jurisdictions cannot agree on how
to resolve them. Certain conflicts of qualifications and conflicts
regarding corporate residence are salient examples.89
Nonetheless, hybrid mismatches are difficult to stomach for
the international tax regime since they present income that one
feels obviously should be taxed, but is not. It is not taxed either
because it is “stateless,”90 it is generated by a hybrid entity, or it
is characterized differently in different jurisdictions. Only a dou-
ical elements within the host jurisdiction. The digital PE expands the PE con-
cept to include also significant digital footprint in a host country granting it
taxing rights despite the absence of significant physical presence by foreign
taxpayers within its jurisdiction. The BEPS project rejected the “digital PE”
route. See ACTION 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 41; see also Lee A. Sheppard,
News Analysis: OECD BEPS Project Unlikely to Endorse Digital PE, TAX
ANALYSTS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/oecd-beps-pro-
ject-unlikely-endorse-digital-pe.
89. See supra note 46.
90. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAXREV. 699 (2011).
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ble non-taxation perspective could provide a practicable frame-
work for identifying what is inappropriate in tax planning that
relies on mismatches.91
The final report clearly identifies the problem created by hy-
brid mismatches as one of double non-taxation, yet it chooses to
recommend a two-pronged solution that does not include a clear
articulation of double non-taxation as a fundamental principle
of the international tax regime or tax treaties. The principle of
double non-taxation, regardless of its desirability, could at least
guide the future development of standards of application and op-
erative rules to combat the undesirable consequences of hybrid
mismatch arrangements.
Instead, the report recommends amendments to domestic and
model treaty laws.92 This approach demonstrates a clear prefer-
ence for minimizing the scope for the BEPS project and rejecting
the opportunity it presents for a comprehensive international
tax reform. One may argue that the OECD has taken a “prag-
matic” approach, yet this would merely be camouflaging the pol-
icy choice taken by the OECD on this matter. It would also be a
clear retreat from the general obligation of the OECD to the fun-
damental insights of BEPS. The emphasis on domestic anti-
abuse rules all but eliminates the commitment to a collaborative
approach, relying primarily on ad hoc, unilateral measures with
no innovation, as the recommendations replicate work already
launched by the OECD in the pre-BEPS era.93
Part I of the report includes a set of specific recommendations
based on domestic law changes to combat payments made under
hybrid financial instruments or by a hybrid entity or hybrid mis-
matches imported into a third jurisdiction. The idea here was to
establish a set of “best practices” based on the theory that if all
countries follow such practices, hybrid mismatches would not re-
sult in undesirable outcomes. Yet, even the report itself seems
unconvinced that the desired result would occur, and hence it
proposes alternative, “defensive” domestic anti-abuse rules that
would be effective in cases where relevant countries do not follow
the first-order recommendations. The OECD did not explain why
91. See Brauner, supra note 61.
92. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], NEUTRALISING THE
EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION 2 - 2015 FINAL REPORT
(2015).
93. See OECD, supra note 3, Annex D: Current and Past OECD Work Re-
lated to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, at 83–87.
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it expects that countries would ignore self-interest, best self-as-
sessment of the desirable rules, and the possibility of defection
by other countries in order to follow its best practices. The pro-
vision of the defensive rules is proof that the OECD does not be-
lieve that progress toward resolving lack of coordination that
leads to BEPS and hybrid tax planning can truly be made. One
is left puzzling how that is different from the current state of
affairs.
Yet, the content of these proposed best practices is even worse
than the refusal to admit defeat. It lacks any logic or reason and
does not even rely on a double non-taxation framework. The
OECD simply chose one set of countries (generally the resi-
dences of the payors) to make concessions over others (generally
the residences of the payees) in a variety of specific tax-planning
outcomes. The OECD decided, without any explanation or anal-
ysis, the consequences of these choices. It is all neatly set in elab-
orate tables, but nothing is provided in terms of the rationale or
even an assessment of the winners or losers from the recommen-
dations. The solutions provided by the OECD are merely tech-
nical. Why would countries follow these recommendations un-
less they expect to “win” accidentally, and even then, their win-
ning is conditional upon the “loser” country’s decision to follow
the rules as well for reasons unfathomable? Of course, even ar-
bitrary arrangements could work in a well-coordinated regime
when participants believe that, overall, they would benefit from
such a regime, yet this is not the case here. The action item did
not establish or even fully discuss such a coordination mecha-
nism. Countries could easily defect with essentially no conse-
quences.
The stubborn reluctance to deal with principles that haunt this
action item may eventually become the focus of attention, mis-
matches being the most direct articulation of BEPS-style plan-
ning. The OECD is attracted to the appeal of the so-called single
tax principle and, more specifically, the view of double taxation
and double non-taxation as parallel or mirror problems. Yet, as
already mentioned, the implementation of this view in practice
is problematic (despite the OECD approach to action item 2 be-
ing pragmatic) since requiring a jurisdiction to concede taxation
is very different from requiring it to tax when it does not wish
to. In the former case, revenue may be lost, yet a promise of more
investment and a better competitive position ensues. In the lat-
ter situation, however, the jurisdiction gets some revenue, if any,
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in exchange for a worse competitive position because the country
had already made that assessment when it chose not to tax in
the first place. The actual recommendation primarily is to deny
the deduction and not to tax the non-included income, yet the
impact is similar. Domestically, this choice could be worse than
reluctant inclusions since identical transactions would get a de-
duction in the purely domestic setting but not across borders,
which is manifestly inefficient.
Part II of the report complements these rules with required
treaty changes to ensure the compatibility of treaties with the
recommendations of Part I. This part focuses mainly on the dif-
ficulty of establishing corporate residence, which is an unre-
solved issue to date.94 The solution is to drop the current pro-
posed general and tie-breaking rule of effective management
and replace it with a case-by-case analysis. This is reasonable
because the current rule had no chance of implementation in the
first place, yet, to replace it with a no-test (case-by-case analysis)
would not project progress.95 The lack of a solution for this issue
signals a weakness of the BEPS project. Of course, it does not
innovate, for instance, by eliminating the need to determine cor-
porate residence. Such conservatism is, again, in contrast to the
BEPS insights.
One cannot ignore the centrality of the United States’ check-
the-box regime96 in this context as well as its effective refusal to
discuss its reform. What is at stake here is a real issue that not
only features well in tax planning generally but also figures
prominently in the actual transactions that triggered the BEPS
project. Nonetheless, the BEPS project chose to ignore this ele-
phant in the room.
94. Omri Y. Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613
(2013).
95. A no-test, ultimately, is more desirable in terms of policy than the cur-
rent norm, yet, in the context of BEPS, one cannot avoid the conclusion that it
did not push the BEPS agenda forward, regardless of what one thinks the pur-
pose of the project should have been.
96. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2016). CTB apparently came
under significant scrutiny in the BEPS context, yet the United States appears
adamant on keeping it. See David D. Stewart, BEPS Seen as Area of Both Con-
sensus and Conflict, TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/corporate-taxation/beps-seen-area-
both-consensus-and-conflict/2013/09/19/41796.
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The report further recommends implementation of the 1999
OECD Partnership Report97 in the form of a model convention
provision and commentary. The problem here is that the OECD’s
partnership report has made little progress in the fifteen years
since it was published and has faced much criticism. The OECD
promises that it will really work once all of the countries adopt
it. Yet, there is no innovation or any other new arguments to
convince opponents and perceived losers to join in. Lastly, the
action item 2 final report tackles potential conflicts between the
proposed (mostly domestic) rules and current treaties and gladly
asserts that, if the OECD recommendations were accepted as is,
no conflicts should arise. This part reads again like an advertis-
ing conclusion with no principles and no analysis.
In conclusion, this action item should result in little to no im-
pact on tax treaties. The removal of the unworkable tie-breaking
rule for corporate residence is appropriate, but is merely cos-
metic because it had no realistic chance of impact anyway. Some
countries, however, may choose to include specific rules regard-
ing partnerships and hybrid entities in tax treaties, perhaps fol-
lowing the OECD recommendation in its partnership report. It
is unlikely that such inclusion would be universal, however, be-
cause so many of the mismatch issues would remain intact. Yet,
in treaties between some like-minded treaty partners, this could
be positive since it would provide more clarity on this important
issue. There are no actual signs, however, that such action is ef-
fectively planned anywhere.
3. Action Item 3: Strengthen Controlled Foreign Corporation
Rules
Deferral is an important feature of tax planning in most pro-
ductive countries. Therefore, reform of anti-deferral regimes,
such as the controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) rules, suppos-
edly makes sense within the BEPS project.98 It is not only im-
portant but also relevant because the most conspicuous failures
97. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The Application of the
OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, ISSUES IN INT’L TAXATION, no. 6,
Aug. 26, 1999; MICHAEL LANG, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX
CONVENTION TO PARTNERSHIPS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT PREPARED
BY THEOECDCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS (1999).
98. See ACTION 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 44.
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of the United States’ Subpart F regime99 were exploited in the
classic BEPS-initiating schemes.100 Yet, these were rather par-
ticular to U.S. law. CFC rules are mostly unilateral measures
used by residence countries to protect their tax base as they view
it within the framework of the current competition-based inter-
national tax regime. Source countries tolerate them, so long as
they are limited in scope, but only as part of the general rules of
the competition game. Now, the residence countries, via BEPS,
wish to generalize the use of CFC rules, recruiting other coun-
tries (at the expense of these other countries) to protect their tax
bases for no consideration. It is difficult to understand why the
other countries would make any effort to accommodate these
wishes.
Moreover, the wisdom of the choice to focus on CFC regimes is
questionable. The OECD has not done much work in this area
beyond legitimizing CFC legislation as not being contradictory
to tax treaty obligations.101 CFC regimes are a common title for
a variety of legal constructs that tax income from foreign invest-
ment of resident taxpayers.102 Nonetheless, the value of deferral
is not merely the time value of money supposedly gained but in
ancillary rules and potential rate changes that make deferral at-
tractive for tax planning.103 These different methods have differ-
ent goals and effects,104 so it would be tricky to develop best prac-
tices here. It would be especially difficult to sell such a regime to
countries not worried about deferral but worried about the cost
of enforcing the CFC rules without BEPS-related or other rea-
sons.
The report effectively reads like reluctant recommendations
for those wishing to legislate CFC rules. It is clear that the
99. This is Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 951–960, which in-
cludes the United States’ CFC rules. I.R.C. §§ 951–960.
100. These schemes were widely exposed elsewhere. See supra text accompa-
nying note 6.
101. OECD COMMENTARIES, supra note 55, art. 1, para. 23.
102. For example, the OECD’s own comparative study. See ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION
(1996). For a recent study of these regimes, see Int’l Fiscal Assoc., 98a CAHIERS
DEDROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL (2013).
103. For further explanation, see DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2014).
104. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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OECD does not expect all countries to follow these recommenda-
tions.105 There are no tax treaty implications for these recom-
mendations.
4. Action Item 4: Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deductions
and Other Financial Payments
Action item 4 is again an interesting action item since its focus
is quite clear and acceptable as appropriate for BEPS. In fact, in
the first stages of the project the consensus opinion was that this
would be the first action item to gain consensus since most of the
various anti-abuse rules used by countries did not rely on par-
ticular policy differences or specific interests but rather on an
arbitrary choice out of a not very diverse menu. Yet, progress
has stalled. It is likely that institutional interests are at play
here since throughout the project the OECD failed to find a best
rule for harmonization of interest deductibility rules. Instead,
the OECD was busy protecting the arm’s length principle and its
action item 2 effort that significantly overlapped with action
item 4, but was more general and thus more complex to resolve
with consensus.
Eventually, however, the OECD came up with the recommen-
dation that was predicted to win the day from the beginning.106
It is a best practice recommendation to adopt a domestic rule
limiting interest (and equivalent) deductions based on a fixed
ratio of interest to a percentage of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”).107 The OECD
recommends that the fixed ratio be sufficiently low, between 10
percent and 30 percent. The OECD, however, also permits a va-
riety of alternative rules. The report further recommends the
105. Especially not EU member states, which are bound by European Court
of Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence that significantly limits the potential scope of
CFC regimes. See OECD, supra note 3, at 38.
106. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], LIMITING BASE EROSION
INVOLVING INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER FINANCIAL PAYMENTS, ACTION 4 -
2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 4 FINAL REPORT].
107. EBITDA is a financial accounting measure typically used as an approx-
imation of a company’s operating cash flow based on data from a corporation’s
income statement. It is relevant in the context of action item 4 since it is es-
sentially the money that the corporation has available for interest payments.
Note that EBITDA is relevant for large corporations with significant assets
and potential accounting distortions; these are the same corporations that the
BEPS project is targeting.
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adoption of domestic anti-abuse rules that prevent circumven-
tion of the primary rule, whatever it may be.
It is not difficult to observe that consensus has not been
reached here and the OECD cannot rally the troops, even for a
best practice single recommendation. Much work remains, as
acknowledged by the report itself, so at best a first step toward
very loose coordination has been taken, mainly in the form of a
better understanding of the options. No impact on tax treaties,
however, is expected.
5. Action Item 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Ef-
fectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance
One of the most newsworthy action items, action item 5, fo-
cuses on so-called patent boxes or intellectual property regimes.
Yet the scope of this action item is wider and seeks a better ar-
ticulation and focus to combat harmful tax competition.108 This
is a proper BEPS goal, as it acknowledges that the current com-
petition framework has failed, and a coordinated approach
against inappropriate actors is required. Similar to the dilemma
presented by action item 2, the difficulty is to identify what is
appropriate and what is not. Prior work, including that of the
OECD attempting to target types of actors, tax havens, and spe-
cific beneficial tax regimes within non-havens, has failed.109
Therefore, action item 5 attempts a different and perhaps sub-
stantive approach.
The final report asserts that countries support an approach
based on nexus and substantial activity in a country to justify
108. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COUNTERING HARMFUL
TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND
SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 5 FINAL
REPORT].
109. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 13 (1998),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf. The OECD has even dis-
continued the maintenance of its Harmful Tax Competition website. For a
more optimistic view of the campaign, yet one that includes a fair, and not-so-
favorable evaluation of it, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax
Competition Report: A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective 1 (Univ. of Mich. Law
Sch., Pub. Law& Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 115,
2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1194942.
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tax jurisdiction.110 Costs incurred serve as a proxy for substan-
tial activity in a jurisdiction. This is explained in the patent box
context: if a taxpayer incurs significant research and develop-
ment (R&D) costs in a jurisdiction, she should be able to enjoy a
preferential regime that attempts to incentivize R&D in such ju-
risdiction. So, such a preferential regime would not be consid-
ered harmful. This concept should be accompanied with trans-
parency, including the exchange of ruling information.
The proposed concept has not been recommended as a rule but
rather as a framework for monitoring and increasing transpar-
ency, including a peer-review mechanism. This is a format very
similar to that of the Global Forum’s and should make the G20
comfortable as well.111 The problem is that it is not dramatically
different from past failed attempts to identify and eliminate
harmful tax competition that had followed similar patterns.112
Substantively, it is based on familiar concepts of substance,
nexus, and expenditure and it does not add much clarification to
them. A key question here is whether the institutional progress
would now make this effort successful where past efforts along
similar paths have failed. It is difficult to assess this matter.
Further, recent considerations among some leading economies
to adopt rather than eliminate the same patent boxes that this
action item attempts to target are discouraging signs.113
There is no impact on tax treaties beyond the use of transpar-
ency mechanisms such as exchange of information provisions. If
translated into an effective exchange of tax rulings, however,
this modest part of the action plan may eventually develop into
110. See ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT, supra note 108.
111. For information on the Global Forum, see Global Forum on Transpar-
ency, supra note 48. For information on the G20 tax work, see Herzfeld, supra
note 47; Grinberg, supra note 49; Itai Grinberg & Joost Pauwelyn, The Emer-
gence of a New International Tax Regime: The OECD’s Package on Base Ero-
sion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/24/emergence-new-interna-
tional-tax-regime-oecd%E2%80%99s-package-base-erosion-and.
112. Avi-Yonah, supra note 109.
113. For example, the proposed bill for the United States to adopt an “inno-
vation box.” H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., INNOVATION
PROMOTION ACT OF 2015 DISCUSSION DRAFT (Comm. Print 2015), http://way-
sandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Innovation-Box-2015-Bill-
Text.pdf; U.K. Issues Patent Box Rules Legislation, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY
(Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/imp/18118686.
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the sole coordination regime developed in the substantive part
of the BEPS action plan to the extent that one views exchange
of rulings as substantive. No effective impact in the content of
tax treaties is expected.
6. Action Item 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in
Inappropriate Circumstances
This peculiar action item makes the statement that BEPS, or
abusive tax planning, may be affected through tax treaties.114
This is a controversial statement since treaties operate at the
substantive level merely to restrict domestic law provisions.
They do not impose or exempt from taxation and, most im-
portantly, they are essentially elective (even if divergently under
different constitutional constructs). Yet, in fact, action item 6 fo-
cuses on treaty shopping and fails to establish a meaningful po-
sition on what may constitute treaty abuse beyond treaty shop-
ping. Now, treaty shopping is indeed an issue that may be
viewed as contributing to profit shifting, yet the issue here is not
one of abuse but rather the appropriate purpose and scope of tax
treaties. The United States has been a well-known pioneer (and
at times a much-criticized pioneer) in the application of a treaty-
based anti-shopping rule, the now well-known limitation on ben-
efits (LOB).115 The LOB has been a polite revision of the Article
4 residence rules that gave powers to treaty partners (of the
United States in this case) to determine effectively domestic res-
idence for corporations on a unilateral basis. The United States
was unwilling to concede such power to all of its treaty partners,
understanding that some of them serve as willing accommodat-
ing jurisdictions for treaty shopping. The United States was un-
willing to accept a state of affairs that would have effectively
made every treaty “a treaty with the world,”116 at least as far as
investment through corporations was concerned. Yet, the United
States wanted to maintain such treaties, and the addition of the
114. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PREVENTING THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 -
2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT].
115. See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 22 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY 2016).
116. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THEUNITED STATESMODEL
INCOME TAXCONVENTION OFNOV. 15, 2006 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2006),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/hp16802.pdf.
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LOB was considered a good solution for these combined wishes.
It also fit the tax law culture of the United States in its objective
façade and through its circumvention of general anti-avoidance
rule (GAAR)-type delegations of power to the tax administration.
Action item 6 followed the U.S. example and even recommends
a U.S.-style LOB provision in its final report.117 The report states
that LOB provisions are successfully used, yet it does not ad-
dress their faults and the criticism over some of their features.118
This recommendation is supplemented by a very different meas-
ure: the principle purpose test (“PPT”). PPT reads much like a
domestic GAAR and empowers tax authorities to deny treaty
benefits to transactions in order to take advantage of the tax
benefits of the treaty, unless it is established that the grant of
such benefits is in accordance with the object and purpose of the
treaty.119 This provision is fraught with problems, and, most im-
portantly, it may add nothing to tax treaties beyond compliance
and enforcement expenses.120 It is obvious that the focus of this
rule is not mere treaty shopping, yet the report does not expand
on the reason for this rule beyond its similarity to domestic
GAARs. These recommendations are presented in a minimal
standard framework (i.e., the OECD expects countries to adopt
either one or both of these rules in their treaties).
The striking difference between the LOB and the PPT is obvi-
ous. They represent different norms and focuses and they are
likely to produce different outcomes. Their marriage here simply
has no intellectual basis. The BEPS project acknowledges this
through the action item 7 report and anticipates that the PPT
will prevent abuse of Article 5(3) by splitting contracts.121 Any
LOB provisions would clearly not cover such abuse, yet it is and
should be covered by the commentary and regular interpretation
of Article 5(3).
117. See ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT, supra note 114.
118. See J. Clifton Fleming, Searching for the Uncertain Rationale Underly-
ing the US Treasury’s Anti-treaty Shopping Policy, 40 INTERTAX 245 (2012).
119. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
120. SeeMichael Lang, BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax
Treaties, 74 TAXNOTES INT’L 655, 656 (2014).
121. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PREVENTING THE
ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS, ACTION 7 - 2015
FINAL REPORT 44 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 7 FINALREPORT].
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The current architecture of the report signals a lack of consen-
sus or a compromise that is incompatible with the first insight
of BEPS. Perhaps, however, a treaty anti-abuse rule is unneces-
sary in the first place, and the recommendation(s) pursuant to
action item 6 will eventually have no impact on BEPS or the in-
ternational tax regime.122
The report also includes a third recommendation to include a
statement about the commitment of the treaty parties to com-
batting double non-taxation in order to solidify it as a purpose of
tax treaties.123 This proposal was criticized as superfluous as the
same could and should be easily interpreted into the treaty. This
is true, yet experience shows that what should be done is not
always done in the course of treaty interpretation and, therefore,
this addition may eventually be helpful.
Finally, the report includes careful language that effectively
serves to discourage countries from signing tax treaties with low
or no-tax jurisdictions. There are, however, no coordination or
implementation aspects for this part. This is an obvious missed
opportunity for coordination among the productive countries of
the world; yet, it is likely that this part did not garner the nec-
essary political will.
Of course, this action item affects tax treaties and requires the
addition of an internal anti-abuse rule(s). It is unclear, in fact
doubtful, however, whether it would effectively impact the prac-
tice of tax treaty law. This article suggests that it would not do
so beyond some countries attempting to use it for aggressive, un-
principled audit practices, which cannot be desirable. Hence,
this action itemmay result in less coordination among countries,
not more.
7. Action Item 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Perma-
nent Establishment Status
The permanent establishment (PE) rules are clearly part of the
core architecture of tax treaties.124 They are also the most im-
portant treaty norm adopted by domestic legislation worldwide,
122. Beyond, perhaps, a standardization of LOB provisions.
123. See ACTION 6 FINAL REPORT, supra note 114.
124. For an authoritative review of the history and origins of the concept, see
ARVID A. SKAAR, PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT: EROSION OF A TAX TREATY
PRINCIPLE (1991).
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even if not universally.125 Yet, the deficiency of the rules has
been exposed by changes in the global economy and the thriving
of globalization.126 The key challenge for these rules is presented
by the digital economy, yet dealing with that challenge was out-
sourced to action item 1, with a clear understanding that the
OECD would not recommend the inclusion of an innovative dig-
ital PE.127 Nevertheless, many other issues related to the PE
rules remained at the top of the international tax regime
agenda.128 Awkwardly, the BEPS project chose to focus on only
three issues: one serious, yet fundamental and not necessarily
related to BEPS; the second not very serious, resulting from
manifestly faulty interpretations of tax treaties by various
courts; and the final, important, (if sectoral) application to in-
surance companies.129 The final report dealt only with the first
two issues, simply stating that the regular rules are sufficient to
deal with problems related to insurance arrangements, despite
the practical difficulties faced by countries in this regard.130
The first issue regards Article 5(4) of the OECD Model and its
language as “preparatory or auxiliary.” It is argued that this lan-
guage does not literally apply to all of the circumstances men-
tioned in this PE “negative list,”131 leaving a wide window of op-
portunity for foreign businesses to operate within a jurisdiction
125. See, e.g., Jacque Sasseville & Arvid A. Skaar (General Reporters), Is
There a Permanent Establishment?, 94a IFA CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL
INTERNATIONAL (2009).
126. Indeed, prior to BEPS the OECD had been engaged in a lengthy and
comprehensive project to resolve many of these issues. This work resulted in
the OECD Model Tax Convention revisions of Article 5. See ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION: REVISED
PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 5
(PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT) (2012–2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/trea-
ties/PermanentEstablishment.pdf.
127. ACTION 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 41, at 283.
128. See Sasseville & Skaar, supra note 125.
129. The rest of the work was explicitly “shelved.” See, e.g., Stephanie Soong
Johnston, OECD’s Work on Permanent Establishments on Hold for BEPS, TAX
NOTES TODAY (June 4, 2013), http://www.taxnotes.com/beps-expert/corporate-
taxation/oecds-work-permanent-establishments-hold-
beps/2013/06/05/16715881.
130. See ACTION 7 FINAL REPORT, supra note 121.
131. Article 5(4) of the OECDModel lists instances that would not constitute
PE, and, hence, it is often described as the PE “negative list.” SeeOECDMODEL
CONVENTION 2010, supra note 46, art. 5(4).
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without triggering PE taxation. Both the purpose of the negative
list and a certain reading of its language requires such an inter-
pretation in the first place, yet the OECD as a representative of
the residence states could not make it clear prior to this report.
The report recommends changing the Model and Commentary
to reflect this interpretation in order to add further clarification
in the form of an anti-fragmentation rule. This outcome fits the
political background of BEPS and expands source taxation.
The second issue relates to commissionaire arrangements, in-
terpreted under the laws of some countries, by some courts,132 as
not triggering PE for a selling corporation because the selling
agent (the commissionaire agent) does not have the authority to
conclude contracts on behalf of the principal (the selling corpo-
ration). Such authority is required under Article 5(5) of the
OECD model. The report clarifies that the policy is to permit PE
taxation in a country where sales are affected by agents on a
regular basis and implemented by the principal corporation, de-
spite the lack of formal contracting authority. The report shall
amend the OECD Model and Commentary to reflect this policy
clearly.
Tax treaties are impacted, of course, by these changes to the
OECD Model and Commentary, yet most of the changes are es-
sentially clarifications rather than material innovations or rea-
lignments of taxing rights. The OECD chose to change the lan-
guage of the Model rather than just change the commentary,
which is the normal practice in cases of clarifications. This
should lead to confusion, at least in the short-term. Taxpayers
are likely to claim that language changes must have independ-
ent meaning and hence cannot be viewed as mere clarifications,
despite the OECD rhetoric. This may not carry the day in most
courts, yet it will surely be costly for both taxpayers and tax au-
thorities, and coordination is unlikely to be enhanced.
132. See, e.g., CE, Mar. 31, 2010, Rec. Lebon 304715 (Fr.); Dell Products v.
Skatt Øst, HR-2011-02245-A (Dec. 2, 2011) (Nor.); S.T.S., Jan. 11, 2012 (R.J.,
No. 1626/2008) (Spain); see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., A Note on the Zimmer
Case and the Concept of Permanent Establishment, in TAX TREATY CASE LAW
AROUND THEGLOBE 107 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079317.
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8. Action Items 8–10: Guidance on Transfer-Pricing Aspects of
Intangibles
Transfer pricing, and particularly the arm’s length standard
that dominates the practice of transfer pricing, is at the very
heart of the BEPS project. Aggressive transfer pricing for intan-
gibles was the key component in essentially all of the schemes
that triggered the project.133 The most visible of these schemes
relies primarily on the benefits of U.S. cost-sharing regulations
that are specific to U.S. tax law.134 Nonetheless, the application
of arm’s length to intangibles has never been adequate.135 It dic-
tates market-based valuation of property (intangible property)
that is unique by law or design, and hence very difficult to
value.136 It requires the use of market comparables in circum-
stances where such comparables or relevant markets simply do
not exist. This problem has been known for some time, yet (es-
sentially all) governments, and the OECD, chose not to address
the problem and stuck to the arm’s length standard without de-
viation.
The BEPS project had to address it. Its original documents
clearly admitted the problem and acknowledged the necessity of
deviating from the arm’s length standard in certain cases.137 The
final report, as well as prior documents released, indicates that
the OECD intends to continue and protect the reliance on arm’s
133. See Brauner, supra note 20, at 41; Kleinbard, supra note 90, at 706;
Yariv Brauner, Cost Sharing and the Acrobatics of Arm’s Length Taxation, 38
INTERTAX 554 (2010); Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of
U.S. Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, are Being
Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247 (2012).
134. See Brauner, supra note 20, at 41 (referencing Treas. Reg. § 1482-7).
135. It provides inherent, yet implicit, advantages to large, intangible-heavy
MNEs. These advantages include the obvious opportunities to engage in tax
rates and rules arbitrage and the ability to take advantage of the range of ac-
ceptable transfer prices. See Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder:
The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAXREV. 79,
161–62 (2008) (explaining that the transfer-pricing rules produce a range of
acceptable prices; such range is available only to MNEs—and more so to intan-
gible-extensive MNEs—to minimize their effective taxation unrelated to other
tax planning).
136. Id.
137. See OECD, supra note 3, at 42–43.
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length for transfer-pricing purposes.138 The final report posits
that the problem is not in the standard itself but rather in the
fact that it is prone to abuse, and hence it needs protection, in-
cluding special measures that may deviate from the standard’s
direct articulation.139
Interestingly, yet reasonably, the OECD introduced a princi-
ple in this context—a principle that requires profits to follow real
income generation activity or “value creation” in the language of
BEPS. It is interesting since such a principle does not obviously
correspond to the market-based arm’s length standard. Value
creation may or may not be perfectly reflected in prices. None-
theless, the report presumes that the value-creation principle is
not an innovation but merely the correct interpretation of the
arm’s length standard. The implication of this approach is a re-
vision of the transfer pricing guidelines (“TPG”)140 to require
profit allocation, based on arm’s length methodology, only to
value-creating activities and to disregard activities that do not
make business sense or are not contributing to the creation of
value for the taxpayer.
A complementary statement would be the rejection of profit al-
location based on mere legal ownership of an intangible good.
This is BEPS compatible and should be lauded, but the real test
would be whether it could be implemented and how courts would
react when this approach conflicts with traditional, literal arm’s
length jurisprudence.141 Moreover, even if the value creation
principle is vague, it is unlikely to permit taxation by source
countries solely based on their being the target, or the market
for the tested goods and services. This is relevant for transfer-
pricing claims based on market facilities rather than value cre-
ation, and even for claims by developing countries for extra allo-
cations based on locational savings.
A similar conflict would arise in the context of action item 1 if
a nexus-based approach were to be taken. Note that there is no
138. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ALIGNING TRANSFER
PRICINGOUTCOMES WITHVALUE CREATION, ACTIONS 8–10 - 2015 FINAL REPORTS
(2015) [hereinafter ACTIONS 8–10 FINAL REPORTS].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Jens Wittendorff, BEPS Actions 8–10: Birth of a New Arm’s
Length Principle, 81 TAXNOTES INT’L 331 (2016). Also note that prior U.S. ex-
perience was not very promising in this regard. For example, see the Veritas
and Altera decisions and analysis. See Michael L. Schler, The Arm’s-Length
Standard After Altera and BEPS, 149 TAXNOTES 1149 (2015).
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right or wrong here. It is merely part of the renegotiation of the
tax-base division deal. Yet, the current system, which is coordi-
nated with the value-creation principle, attempts to base the
deal on supposed economic truth. This must be unsustainable; it
may be possible to reach compromises, or force legitimacy based
on the pseudoeconomic justifications for the current rules, but
not to actually justify them in any coherent and comprehensive
manner. Moreover, once countries such as China and India agree
to the value-creation rhetoric they would find themselves in a
problematic position of seeking enhanced tax jurisdiction based
on parameters other than value creation. The disagreement over
the meaning of the term was not resolved by the final report, and
hence no progress was made on the important aspect of revenue
division under the international tax regime.
A second transfer-pricing rule established by the report is the
limitation on the allocation of profits to risk-taking. Originally,
this part of the work, using a pure tax-haven cash-box example
to demonstrate inappropriate planning, purported to disallow al-
location of profits to mere cash investors.142 The final report es-
tablishes a softer rule that permits risk-taking to be taken into
account only when the relevant taxpayer has the capacity to both
meaningfully control and assume the risk. It remains to be seen
how much abuse this softer rule will prevent beyond the most
egregious of cases. The prohibition on assignment of profits be-
yond risk-free returns on cash-only contributions remains part
of the report, which is desirable, yet it is not clear whether it
would practically apply also in situations where the taxpayer
can establish minimal contribution beyond cash for the cash box,
low-tax entity.
The report promotes the profit split method in a move that has
been in the making for a long time now.143 Yet, the content of
this promotion was left for the post-BEPS era (i.e., probably for
an OECD-only forum). It further provides that synergistic value
will have to be allocated according to the parties’ contribution to
such values.144 This part of the report is awkward since syner-
gies are not really a result of one contribution or another. Again,
it is difficult to see how such a rule would affect tax planning.
142. See ACTIONS 8–10 FINAL REPORTS, supra note 138.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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In conclusion, the impact of the action items 8–10 final report
on tax treaties is likely to be minimal beyond the amendments
it introduces to the TPG. If widely adopted, the changes to the
TPG may end up having a minimal impact, preventing only the
most aggressive and extreme cases, such as pure cash boxes. It
does not alleviate the difficulties of intangible valuation, and
does not provide concrete steps in the direction of deviations
from arm’s length in necessary cases. The only immediate effect
is perhaps the maintenance of OECD dominance over the TPG,
which is deferred to regularly by many countries’ courts. This
continuous shift of power from governments of non-OECD coun-
tries to the OECD as an institution may, however, be resisted
again, with the likely consequence of less, not more coordination
among jurisdictions regarding their most important tax policies.
It remains to be seen how significant the introduction of the
value-creation principle itself will be. If many countries follow it
strictly, it may significantly alter the practice of transfer pricing
(albeit one should then expect serious variation in the implemen-
tation of this principle because BEPS does not provide guidance
in the area). A more realistic outcome would be that it would
have a minimal impact solely on the transfer-pricing practice
due to the strong commitment of governments and their courts
to literal arm’s length and the comfort that the business commu-
nity already has acquired with this state of affairs. This likely
outcome should be viewed as the biggest disappointment of the
BEPS project and presents the most conservative outcome in the
area most in need of reform and innovation.
9. Action Item 11: Measuring and Monitoring BEPS
Action item 11 begins the “administrative” part of the BEPS
action plan, following action items 1–10 that address substan-
tive, tax-base dividing, norms of the international tax regime.
Preceding the entire BEPS project, one should have asked the
question: “Is BEPS a problem in a perfect world?” Yet, as men-
tioned already, BEPS is essentially a political rather than a sci-
entific project. It was launched based on anecdotal data and pub-
lic outrage rather than facts and analysis. Action item 11 in-
tends to remedy this deficiency and help the project to assess the
magnitude of the problem and monitor it, including the impact
of the project’s solutions to the BEPS problem over time.
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The final report on action item 11 is not final, as it is charged
with establishing an ongoing measurement and monitoring plat-
form, yet it confirms the negative impacts of BEPS, primarily
due to inefficiencies (economic distortions) and revenue losses,
which disproportionally are suffered by developing countries.145
The report further asserts that BEPS is significant and is likely
to increase.146 It notes, however, that its conclusions are severely
limited by the scarcity and quality of data available. The report,
therefore, sets the stage for the increased collection of better
data that will permit a thorough assessment of BEPS in the fu-
ture.
This action item does not have a direct impact on tax treaties
or policy in general. Additionally, it is beyond the scope of this
article to analyze the methodology used by the reporters. Yet, an
educated study of the impact of international tax norms and the
greater collection of better data must be welcomed. Accountabil-
ity should be part of every policy action, yet so often it is ignored,
so the work on this action item must be lauded. One may raise
concern, however, about the opportunities it would present to
the more powerful to abuse the less powerful, but that situation
could not be worse post-BEPS in comparison to the pre-BEPS
era.
10. Action Item 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules
Perhaps the least discussed BEPS action item, action item 12,
presents a framework for countries that wish to adopt rules for
mandatory disclosure of aggressive tax positions by taxpayers.
In the language of the final report, the framework is presented
as, but is not required to be, a minimum standard.147 The pur-
pose of a mandatory disclosure regime is to improve awareness
of tax-planning techniques for tax authorities, to increase trans-
parency in tax planning, and to deter both taxpayers and pro-
moters. Its benefits must be weighed against its costs.
145. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MEASURING AND
MONITORINGBEPS, ACTION 11 - 2015 FINALREPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION
11 FINAL REPORT].
146. Id. at 16.
147. ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. [OECD], MANDATORYDISCLOSURE
RULES, ACTION 12 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 13 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 12 FINAL
REPORT].
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The appeal of such regimes in the context of BEPS is under-
standable, and it fits well among the other transparency-en-
hancing measures, yet the experience of countries already utiliz-
ing them is not very encouraging.148 The key issue is which
transactions require reporting, a determination that dynami-
cally affects inappropriate tax planning as well as tax planning
generally. Thus, the lack of enthusiasm over this action item is
understandable as well. Ultimately, this action item does not af-
fect tax treaties.
11. Action Item 13: Guidance on Transfer-Pricing Documenta-
tion and Country-by-Country Reporting
The most tangible achievement of BEPS, and perhaps its only
real contribution to the evolution of the international tax regime,
is the introduction of standard transfer-pricing documentation
and Country-by-Country (“CbC”) reporting. Transfer-pricing
regulation intends to keep MNEs in check, requiring them to es-
tablish transfer prices based on arm’s length (i.e., market) anal-
ysis and document their position contemporaneously.149 The doc-
umentation requirement fixes the taxpayers’ positions and lim-
its their options. Despite the inherent bilateral (or multilateral)
nature of transfer prices, the rules and reporting apply on a uni-
lateral basis with no coordination or a strong requirement of con-
sistency. This is strange in a regime that applies an essentially
universal standard to multiple countries in parallel to the same
transactions.
Action item 13 seeks to fix some aspects of this anomaly by
standardizing the documentation requirements. The final report
establishes a three-tier reporting regime.150 A master file in-
cludes information that would be necessary for the implementa-
tion of the rules in every relevant country.151 A standard form
148. For the U.S. Rules, see Todd C. Simmens & James G. Hartford, Report-
able Transactions, 648-1st Tax Mgmt. (BNA), U.S. Income, https://www.bloom-
berglaw.com/document/2657753640 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). A similar Bra-
zilian experience has also not been noted. See, e.g., Mesa De Debates Do IBDT
De 10/15/2015 (Oct. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
149. See, e.g., supra note 136.
150. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], TRANSFER PRICING
DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING, ACTION 13 - 2015
FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT].
151. Id. at 25.
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avoids duplication, and hence reduces the costs of compliance
and prevents inconsistent reporting. A country file complements
the master file with more particular information that may be
relevant to specific countries or, for legitimate reasons, infor-
mation uniquely required by one involved country but not by an-
other.152 Finally, a standard CbC report provides an overview of
the entire business of the taxpayer in the different relevant
countries in order to give individual countries a better perspec-
tive on the specific country reporting information relevant to
them and how it fits the general structure and strategy of the
taxpayer.153 Such reporting also encourages consistency in com-
pliance and filing.
This standard three-tier reporting should improve the con-
sistency of transfer-pricing compliance, which one would expect
to be inherent of this norm, yet has been neglected in the current
competition-based international tax regime. It would obviously
be consistent with the single tax principle or, more pointedly,
would assist in avoiding untaxed “gaps” in income reporting be-
cause of inconsistent transfer-pricing positions. It would reduce
the costs of compliance and enforcement, especially for countries
with insufficient budgets for sophisticated enforcement of trans-
fer pricing. It would prevent biased reporting either due to tax-
payers’ interests or power positions of certain countries. Finally,
it would centralize the control over the transfer-pricing regime
and, therefore, set the stage for opportunities for coordination of
policies and enforcement.
The CbC report is the single true innovation of BEPS today.
Yet, the conservative forces within the project have fought to di-
minish its scope, supposedly in the name of protecting taxpayers’
data.154 Whether corporate tax data should be confidential at all
152. Id. at 27.
153. Id. at 29.
154. Compare with the original discussion draft. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], DISCUSSION DRAFT ON TRANSFER PRICING
DOCUMENTATION AND CBC REPORTING (2014), https://www.oecd.org/tax/trans-
fer-pricing/discussion-draft-transfer-pricing-documentation.pdf; see also Lee
Sheppard, OECD BEPS Country-by-Country Reporting is Too Burdensome,
HMRC Official Says, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014),
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/corporate-taxation/beps-seen-area-
both-consensus-and-conflict/2013/09/19/41796 (quoting opposition expressed
by a U.K. official to the discussion draft, claiming that it goes too far and re-
quires reporting of information that is not obviously necessary for effective tax
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is beyond the scope of this article, yet it is clear that the con-
servative forces have succeeded in significantly limiting the
scope of the CbC report to information that is generally already
available or could be available to most sophisticated, well-
funded tax authorities. Moreover, the same forces dictated that
the report should only be available to the tax authorities to keep
the information confidential.155 Finally, the same forces suc-
ceeded in adding a clarification that the CbC report would not
directly be used for tax assessment but only for risk assessment
purposes (i.e., to identify problems).156 Such clarification aims
primarily at the prevention of deviation from arm’s length and
resorts to formulary apportionment.157 The structure of the CbC
report is particularly amenable to formulary taxation that has
been consistently rejected, at least rhetorically, by the OECD.
The very resort to such a report demonstrates the necessity of
formulary apportionment for a sensible enforcement of income
taxes on MNEs.
The actual implementation of the action item 13 reports will
likely be the major test for the future impact of BEPS. The im-
pact on tax treaties is indirect since the reports would not
change the substance of tax treaties, but would make transfer-
pricing consistency necessarily better, which would reduce the
audits, which is very much in line with the traditional OECD competition-
based approach).
155. For arguments in favor of confidentiality, see ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT,
supra note 150, at 19, 22; David Ernick, Will Public Disclosure of Country-by-
Country Reporting Data Become Mandatory?, 44 TAXMGMT. INT’L J. 362 (2015).
But see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on Tax Transparency to Fight Tax Evasion and Avoidance, COM
(2015) 136 final (Mar. 18, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/re-
sources/documents/taxation/company_tax/transparency/com_2015_136_en.pdf
(EU proposal to mandate public disclosure of such tax information).
156. See ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 150, at 16.
157. For an example of a proposal to adopt formulary taxation of business
profits more generally, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah &Kimberly Clausing,Reform-
ing Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary
Apportionment, in PATH TO PROSPERITY: HAMILTON PROJECT IDEAS ON INCOME
SECURITY, EDUCATION, ANDTAXES 319–44 (Jason Furman & Jason Bordoff eds.,
2007); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportion-
ment: Myths and Prospects - Promoting Better International Tax Policy and
Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 221, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693105.
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inefficiency of treaties and enhance international coordination
of tax policies and enforcement.
Note, however, that the failure to establish a cooperative envi-
ronment within the BEPS project may make action item 13 the
biggest disappointment to OECD conservatives. Few share the
illusion that CbC reports can be kept confidential and that they
would be used merely for risk assessment purposes. Think about
the many developing countries that struggle to collect revenue
from MNEs, that struggle to finance their revenue authorities
adequately, and that may resent the most developed countries
for not yielding more taxing rights to them. Now these authori-
ties are going to obtain official reports that provide a simple map
for taxation by formula cheaply, or at no cost. Unless quick ac-
tion toward coordination is taken post-BEPS, the logical predic-
tion is that such tax authorities will more likely than not use the
transfer-pricing reports in manners other than those prescribed
by the OECD.
12. Action Item 14: Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
More Effective
An international legal regime is often measured by the efficacy
of its dispute resolution regime. The current, soft, non-legalistic
mutual agreement procedure (“MAP”) regime has undoubtedly
been proven successful for the forming years of the regime. Its
non-mandatory nature reduced the perceived threat posed by
the international tax regime to the tax sovereignty of the partic-
ipating nations.158 It also has not prevented the convergence of
the international tax rules, despite not having contributed much
to their development. Many fundamental disputes have actually
been resolved without resort to tax wars, a non-trivial achieve-
ment indeed. Yet, in recent years, it became increasingly appar-
ent that progress is required. A quicker, cheaper, and more de-
cisive regime is needed. Scarcity of revenue, increased competi-
tion for investment, globalization, and decentralization of power,
158. See, e.g., Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Dis-
putes Between Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade
Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 79 (1998).
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and the increasing complexity and sophistication of global busi-
ness requires a more resolute regime that would contribute ra-
ther than just adhere to the universal norms.159
The pre-BEPS OECD project has resulted in a recommenda-
tion for mandatory “baseball” arbitration to be added to the MAP
in cases that the latter fails to resolve in an acceptable
timeframe.160 Some countries have adopted this recommenda-
tion, yet despite the relative success that the solution apparently
enjoys, only a few treaties were concluded based on this recom-
mendation.161 This failure exacerbated BEPS on the one hand
and the unjust treatment of some taxpayers—who could not get
relief—on the other hand. Afterwards, the BEPS project made
another attempt and employed its first insight to organize a rel-
atively large, yet incomplete, group of countries that now commit
to adoption of mandatory arbitration in all of their treaties.162
Success in adopting a multilateral instrument of the kind de-
scribed next may prove to be important for a chance of success
in realizing such commitment. Yet, all the evidence leads to a
conclusion that most countries simply do not trust the OECD
and its leading members to establish a fair arbitration process.
They further believe that qualified arbitrators will likely come
predominantly from such OECD countries and, hence, disad-
vantage them in the process. Nothing was done in the work on
action item 14 to resolve this fundamental problem and ensure
wide and willing cooperation. There is no reason to believe that
progress will be made until such effort is made in earnest. This
action item does not affect the substance of tax treaties, and is
not even new to the OECD Model, yet it is obviously very im-
portant for the future of tax treaties as effective building blocks
of the international tax regime. This future may be in doubt if it
is not realized.
159. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], IMPROVING THE
RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY DISPUTES (2007), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dis-
pute/38055311.pdf.
160. Id.
161. See ACTION 14 FINAL REPORT, supra note 31.
162. Encouragingly, the OECD notes that these countries were involved in
90 percent of outstanding MAP cases at the end of 2013. Id. at 10. None of
these countries, however, represents a developing or an emerging economy.
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13. Action Item 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to
Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties
Enhanced coordination of tax laws and policies is the key in-
sight of the BEPS project: countries are now unable to apply uni-
laterally their tax system, independent of all other countries.
The intuitive notion of national sovereignty at its most funda-
mental level—tax policymaking, collection, and enforcement—
has brutally crashed. Even the strongest countries in the world
find themselves vulnerable. Thus, agreeing to a multilateral so-
lution against this backdrop became inevitable. Action item 15
was charged, therefore, in assessing the feasibility of adopting
such an instrument. Despite the long-standing opposition of
many countries and experts to the notion, the action item 15 re-
port clarifies that such an instrument is both legally and practi-
cally feasible.163 This is dramatic enough, yet the report exceeds
its mandate merely to issue a report and proceeds to work on the
implementation of the instrument.164
The final action item 15 report uses language consistent with
the minimal view of BEPS to promote the adoption of the multi-
lateral instrument.165 It explains that to be effective the BEPS
recommendations must be implemented quickly, cheaply, and
coherently in a synchronized manner. This is impossible in the
current paradigm of pure bilateral negotiation and conclusion of
tax treaties. The BEPS project took advantage of its political
support to conclude that its charge could only be met if such an
instrument is adopted. This perceived instrument does change
the bilateral nature of tax treaties and streamlines standard
amendments to tax treaties, such as those required by BEPS. It
also prevents the elaborate give-and-take nature of bilateral
treaty negotiations and their budget constraints from being ob-
stacles in realizing these goals.
Additionally, the report realizes the possibility of partial or
gradual adoption of the multilateral instrument.166 Such flexi-
bility makes the instrument more appealing (or less intimidat-
ing) and most importantly sidesteps the all-or-nothing approach
that so typified the debate over multilateralism in taxation. Nat-
urally, the success of the instrument will depend on the size of
163. ACTION 15 FINAL REPORT, supra note 83.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 16.
166. As previously argued by Brauner. See Brauner, supra note 12, at 262.
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its early adopters. The devil here is truly in the details. How will
the instrument work if countries begin to demand items not
agreed on within the BEPS project? How will consensus be
achieved with many diverse countries with different interests
involved? Many such questions leave this welcome development
with an unclear future. Ultimately, this action item does not im-
mediately affect the substance of tax treaties, yet it may revolu-
tionize tax treaty law and practice and guarantee their continu-
ous importance for the international tax regime.
B. The Impact of the BEPS Project on Tax Treaty Law
The conclusion of the BEPS project provides an opportunity to
assess its impact on the international tax regime. This section
focuses on the tax treaty implications. For the purposes of this
analysis, it is assumed that the recommendations of the BEPS
project would generally be adopted.
First, very few substantive norms in tax treaties will be im-
pacted by BEPS. The already ineffective tie-breaking rule for
corporate residence in Article 4(3) would be replaced with a
facts-and-circumstances no-rule. The clarification to Article 5(4)
and the corresponding anti-fragmentation rule are just that—
clarifications that could have been achieved through better in-
terpretation of the provision. Similarly, the clarification on com-
missionaire arrangements simply corrects inappropriate inter-
pretations of Article 5(5) by some courts. The only other poten-
tially substantive change may be the insertion of a digital PE
provision in treaties or a similar provision targeting the taxation
of the digital economy. Such a change has not yet been recom-
mended (nor has it been outright rejected), but, unlike these
other minor changes, it would actually alter the tax base division
in some circumstances. Otherwise, no changes in the division of
tax bases are affected by BEPS, which must be viewed as at least
a short-term achievement for the OECD. However, it is difficult
to see how the developing world could stomach such an outcome.
The changes to the TPG cannot be viewed as substantive
changes to tax treaty rules since the treaties are vaguely the
source, if any, of the legal obligation to adhere to the TPG. None-
theless, the intimate relationship between tax treaties and the
TPG make their discussion relevant to the general assessment
of the impact of BEPS on tax treaties. It is possible, however, to
argue that the substantive impact of BEPS on transfer pricing
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is not dramatic. Pure cash boxes are going to be difficult to jus-
tify, business activities will probably167 matter more than risks,
and profit split will continue to be the star of the show (together
with the comparable pricing model and the transactional net
margin method), even though the details regarding profit split
are left for the post-BEPS era.
A careful assessment should, however, be more patient and
acknowledge that these changes, together with the infusion of
the value-creation principle and the completely new standard re-
porting systems, may be more impactful on the practice of trans-
fer pricing. This is true if the OECD is successful and the
changes are properly enforced and coordinated among jurisdic-
tions. But, it would also be meaningful if the changes are unpop-
ular, in which case massive litigation and double taxation are
the likely result, which would put immense pressure on coun-
tries to revisit coordination.
Yet, one cannot avoid expressing a disappointment at these
achievements. No fundamental reform occurred, and mostly it
seemed that the OECD was more interested in declaring success
than reforming the regime. This of course may be the fault of
political forces, not the staff of the BEPS project, yet the bottom
line is the same. This is particularly disappointing in light of the
original promise of BEPS to innovate and address situations
where arm’s length had failed to do the trick. The BEPS project
neglected to follow this promise. The addition of a treaty anti-
abuse mechanism is itself a change of the model convention and
not a change of the tax-base division rules. This change is not
likely to be so dramatic since LOB provisions already exist in tax
treaties and PPT provisions are unlikely to have much impact,
even if adopted in actual tax treaties.
The service part of BEPS promises to make a much stronger
impact on tax treaties. First and foremost, the multinational in-
strument could revolutionize tax treaty law. Even if its imple-
mentation stalls for a while, the conclusion about its feasibility
transforms the discourse from the all-or-nothing binary choice
between the current regime and a world tax government to a
more serious discourse on possible evolution of the regime and a
better understanding of tax treaties. If one takes the view of tax
167. Albeit, the report depends on familiar concepts such as nexus and sub-
stance and such may raise the suspicion that not much would indeed change
in this regard.
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treaties as signals, supported by this article, he or she would ob-
serve that the potential future regime is also better suited for
the true nature of tax treaties.
Second, but in many ways as important, is the progress made
toward reform of the dispute resolution mechanism, and the ad-
dition of mandatory arbitration provisions to many more tax
treaties. Mandatory arbitration is not a BEPS innovation, yet its
adoption has been very slow and inconsistent to date. A pact
among many powerful countries would provide a huge step for-
ward and would add meaningful treaty-based dispute resolution
to the international tax regime.
Third, BEPS introduced the important innovation of standard
transfer-pricing reporting, yet, as already mentioned, this is not
strictly treaty related. That again would significantly improve
the coordination value of tax treaties and would make their op-
eration more effective and hopefully more just. Finally, the other
information collection aspects of BEPS would similarly add to
the efficacy of the regime and of tax treaties (not to mention their
contribution to the study of tax treaties).
In conclusion, the impact of BEPS on tax treaties is generally
small, yet the structural, service elements present a promise of
a much more significant reform of tax treaties and the interna-
tional regime. Since most of these elements do not include con-
crete and immediate reforms of the norms, it is difficult to pre-
dict their actual impact.
C. BEPS, the International Tax Regime, and Enhanced Coordi-
nation
A similar, more indirect impact of BEPS on tax treaties may
be its impact on the international tax regime beyond tax treaty
law. The non-tax treaty reforms dwarf the above-discussed
changes to tax treaties. The bulk of the work of the BEPS project
focused on changes to domestic laws in the general format of best
practices. The idea was that such best practices would eventu-
ally be adopted universally with little changes to enhance the
standardization of the norms of the international tax regime,
which would eliminate stateless income and the prevention of
BEPS. These key reforms include the anti-hybrid-planning norm
recommended by the action item 2 report, the introduction of
standard CFC regimes, a standard limit on interest deduction, a
limitation on preferential regimes in general and patent boxes
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in particular, the revised TPG, and a self-reporting mechanism
for aggressive tax planning.
It is difficult to find a coherent policy that would unite all of
these changes beyond simplistic anti-BEPS measures. Yet, a
common thread does exist: they all operate in a manner that re-
quires or enhances coordination in the international tax regime.
This is interesting since, as coordination devices, these are all at
least second-best measures because they are soft law. Yet, one
can make a valid argument that this is the best that the OECD
could politically achieve in the direction of enhanced coordina-
tion. Perhaps countries do not fully comprehend the first insight
of BEPS. A discussion about the soundness of this argument is
beyond the scope of this article and may be fruitless in any event.
One may criticize the tactics and strategy of BEPS, the OECD,
and the various participants, yet, at the same time, one should
also be realistic about the achievements of the project.
The overall progress toward enhanced coordination of tax pol-
icies and practices indirectly influences tax treaties as a part of
the more general international tax regime. This article con-
cludes that the emphasis on domestic law changes was perhaps
misguided, yet, in the end, it has not altered the balance in the
regime toward neglect of tax treaties as critical building blocks
of the regime. The most important non-treaty effect of BEPS,
however, is not legal. It is the change in the compliance and en-
forcement environment across the globe. Taxpayers face a tsu-
nami of uncertainty and a serious threat to the rule of law in tax
matters. One may view these changes as beneficial—perhaps as
a price to pay for BEPS—yet the threat that this scenario poses
to the stability of the international tax regime, and even to
global investment, is quite serious. Again, the one clear outcome
of BEPS is that it decimated rather than enhanced international
cooperation and coordination of tax policies. The question be-
comes whether this outcome is just temporary, setting up a de-
sirable and meaningful reform, or just a first step toward the
dismantling of the (tax treaty based) international tax regime as
we know it.
III. THE FUTURE OF TAX TREATIES
This part will address the future of tax treaties in light of the
analysis of the impact of BEPS on tax treaties and the interna-
tional tax regime. These are interesting times for tax treaties.
As the BEPS project winds down there is little finality as to its
1024 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
impact on tax treaties or otherwise. The BEPS proposals for
amendments to the OECD Model promise minimal impact (at
best) as well. Yet, perhaps the “fog of war” obscures some mate-
rial developments that may be very meaningful for the future of
tax treaties. The following sections will analyze some of these
potential developments.
A. The Institutional Dimension
The institutional dimension of the international tax regime is
critically important for any analysis of tax treaties. The lack of
current institutionalization of the regime fits its soft law es-
sence, its flexibility, and resilience. Yet, largely, the OECD has
served as a forum for international tax policymaking.168 The role
of the OECD has been particularly significant for the centrality
of tax treaties, them being largely modeled after the OECD
Model.169 Such role was left essentially unchallenged.170
All of the other potential players have not even entered the
match. The United Nations effectively has abandoned its tax
treaty project and, when it recently resumed the project, it pre-
ferred to position itself as complementary to the OECD rather
than a contestant for leadership.171 The World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) escaped responsibility in taxation and has never
gained expertise in the field.172 An independent tax forum, alt-
168. See Brauner, supra note 12, at 310–16; Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of
the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’ Through National Responses
to E-commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006).
169. See THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON
BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, supra note 2.
170. The United Nations tax project, although nominally a competing initia-
tive with its ownmodel convention, has never presented itself as an alternative
and has never been one.
171. See THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON
BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, supra note 2; Wim Wijnen & Jan de Goede, The UN
Model in Practice 1997–2013, 68 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX. 118 (2014),
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/11/9STM_FinalPublishedVersionIBFD.pdf.
172. See Brauner, supra note 12, at 315–16; see also Reuven Avi-Yonah &
Joel Slemrod, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues?,
55 TAX L. REV. 533 (2002) (contemplating the possibility of the WTO as also
encompassing an international tax agreement and promoter of it).
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hough proposed from time to time, was shot down as unreason-
able because it was painted with the unappealing colors of a
world tax government.173
Interestingly, the G20 has entered the picture, which provides
political legitimacy and backing for the BEPS project. For a
while, the more exclusive G8 (now the G7) organization at-
tempted to highjack the project but failed.174 The G20 includes
the largest, but not the richest economies of the world, repre-
senting both OECD and non-OECDmembers.175 Its involvement
clearly challenges the OECD that had dominated the interna-
tional tax regime, at least until recently.176 Yet, such challenge
may also be viewed otherwise—a convenient role for the OECD
as caretaker of the international tax regime.
First, the OECD is charged with the actual management and
implementation of the BEPS project, keeping it in the dominant
position, and precluding an independent development of exper-
tise elsewhere (even the G20 is currently unequipped for that).
Second, the OECD is able to position itself as a partner rather
than an agent for the G20 in the BEPS project.177 This is partic-
ularly striking in light of the fact that BEPS is a response to
failures of the current OECD-led international tax regime.
Third, the partnership with the G20 relieves much of the pres-
sure on the OECD to give a voice to non-OECD members, espe-
cially emerging economies with strong positions in the world
markets like China and India. As already mentioned, the OECD
attempted to relieve some of this pressure by granting observa-
tion privileges to developing countries and involving them in the
discourse, yet that has not been enough. These countries de-
manded a real voice (voting powers) and actual changes in the
norms. The partnership with the G20 permits some acceptance
173. See, e.g., Horner, supra note 21.
174. See Prime Minister’s Office & Cabinet Office, G8 Factsheet: Tax, GOV.UK
(June 7, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-factsheet-
tax/g8-factsheet-tax.
175. See, e.g., G20 Members, G20.ORG, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-mem-
bers/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
176. See, e.g., Herzfeld, supra note 47; Grinberg, supra note 49.
177. Throughout the BEPS documents the OECD presents itself as a partner
“on equal footing” with the G20. See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 5, at 25.
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of these demands without a significant effective concession of
power by the OECD itself.
Finally, partnering with leading developing countries assists
the resolution of some fundamental conflicts that may not have
been possible to resolve within the OECD. In an all-OECD fo-
rum, it would be difficult to consider concessions to source coun-
tries on a unilateral basis, but in such larger forums, politicians
could explain such concessions. This latter advantage was very
apparent since collaborating with the G20 is not new for the
OECD. The establishment of the Global Forum had similar ori-
gins, albeit in a more limited scope.178 The relative success of the
Global Forum, coupled with the preservation of the influence of
the OECD over it, perhaps made the OECD particularly com-
fortable with this arrangement.
Against this backdrop, one should predict that the OECD will
be successful in keeping much of its dominant position over the
international tax regime after BEPS. This means that one
should not expect dramatic changes in tax treaties, but rather a
slow-paced, gradual, andmostly predictable refocusing of the tax
base division, probably in the direction of more deference to
source taxation. This article largely agrees with such a predic-
tion, yet it would add that a paradigm shift toward enhanced
coordination would require changes that may be more signifi-
cant than predicted. Some of these changes would align with
OECD policies, and some would not.
A word of caution is due here regarding the role of the G20 in
the process. It may be tempting to make the argument that the
power within the international tax regime is shifting from the
OECD to the G20.179 The latter is in charge of BEPS and its
adoption politically. It is quite clear that the OECD alone cannot
proceed with any meaningful policy reforms related to the inter-
national tax regime without some key G20 members, especially
China and India. Moreover, parallels between the BEPS project
and the Global Forum, for instance, may be viewed as a shift
toward the way “things are done” by the G20, especially when
coupled with the developments in the Global Forum and other
international actions taken by the G20.180
178. See Grinberg, supra note 49.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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Yet, one should realize that the G20 is a very different organi-
zation from the OECD. G20 goals (global financial stability) are
more limited to begin with.181 It does not compare to the size and
expertise of the OECD personnel (as far as taxation is con-
cerned). It is an umbrella political organization with little inde-
pendent institutional power and lacks a permanent secretariat
or even a headquarters. The revolving leadership of the organi-
zation also affects the ever-changing agenda that is strongly re-
lated to the agenda of the host and chairing country. Interest-
ingly (and convincingly), prominent scholars have argued that
the OECD effectively serves as the secretariat for the G20.182
Therefore, the conclusion that the G20 is not about to take over
from the OECD and change the international tax regime stands.
The more interesting question is what position key G20 mem-
bers (such as the BRICS nations) will hold in the discourse with
the OECD over post-BEPS developments in the regime. The an-
swer is difficult to predict accurately, of course, but, as analyzed
elsewhere, it is both desirable and likely that the OECD will
need to be more inclusive and flexible if it wishes to preserve the
international tax regime.183 An informal initiative, such as the
one run for the BEPS project with the support of the G20, pro-
vides a comfortable environment for the OECD. If the OECD can
sustain it, it probably will. This may be more difficult when
“new” or other non-BEPS conflicts come up. At that point in
time, a more institutionalized, yet similar, forum for interna-
tional tax coordination is likely to be a natural progression from
the ad hoc BEPS project partnership between the OECD and the
G20.
So, what could change? The real question is whether any kind
of an international tax forum can arise post-BEPS. Note that the
BEPS project itself should not be considered as such since the
OECD governs it alone (even if it is endorsed loosely by the G20).
Very recently, the OECD published a call for the establishment
181. See id.
182. See Jan Wouters & Sven Van Kerckhoven, The OECD and the G20: An
Ever Closer Relationship?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 345 (2011).
183. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, A Perspective of Supra-Nationality in Tax Law,
in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 33–38
(Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
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of a new forum for the implementation of the BEPS project.184
Interestingly, this call came a few months after the conclusion
of the BEPS project, not as a direct continuation of BEPS and
with little anchoring in the final stages of the BEPS project. The
OECD alone called all countries, not just the G20, to join it in
this forum. It said that the OECD shall present the forum to the
G20 in 2016 as a natural part of an ongoing partnership between
the two organizations. This is an interesting development and
one that was a long time coming, despite being resisted until now
by the OECD.185 It fits the BEPS agenda and its insights, even
if the actual project has violated such insights. Viewed simply,
it is just the OECD understanding that it could achieve nothing
or close to nothing by acting alone. Yet, such a move also keeps
the OECD at the helm and blocks anyone else from leading a
parallel initiative.
Furthermore, the creation of such a forum also fits two other
major BEPS developments, regarding action items 14 and 15.
BEPS calls for arbitration, which requires a new forum to better
promote its success. By the end of the project, only twenty rich
countries joined, and that will not be sufficient. The new forum
will present an opportunity to convince other countries to join
and to break deals that would have a similar effect. More im-
portantly, the implementation of the multilateral instrument
would require a separate forum already created by the OECD,186
and largely controlled by it, yet some OECD countries (most im-
portantly the United States) are still not on board. This leaves
the OECD and its members vulnerable in a crucial forum that
includes many countries that do not necessarily have interests
aligned with that of the OECD.
The combination of the forums would give the OECD more
power and would hopefully convince the United States to join,
especially if arbitration would be part of the deal brokered be-
cause it is the most important goal of the United States with
respect to BEPS. Additionally, the OECD must understand that
184. All Interested Countries and Jurisdictions to be Invited to Join Global
Efforts Led by the OECD and G20 to Close International Tax Loopholes,
OECD.ORG (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/all-interested-countries-
and-jurisdictions-to-be-invited-to-join-global-efforts-led-by-the-oecd-and-g20-
to-close-international-tax-loopholes.htm.
185. See Brauner, supra note 12.
186. See ACTION 14 FINAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 37–41.
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the combination would also be important since it is unlikely that
once a multilateral instrument is established, if indeed it is suc-
cessfully established, it would be used solely to implement BEPS
according to OECD prescription. Such an instrument will have
to be the basis for a new international tax regime and, itself, an
international tax forum. It would be crucial for the OECD to gain
control over such a forum from the beginning when it still holds
all the cards.187
B. Enhanced Coordination
One of the primary weaknesses of the BEPS project has been
its lack of a clear identity. From the beginning, it suffered from
a duality of purposes. On the one hand it wanted to reform the
international tax regime, bringing it into the twenty-first cen-
tury, yet on the other hand much of it was limited to the pursuit
of specific, limited (even if major in impact) tax-planning
schemes. The latter, minimalist view of the BEPS project domi-
nated throughout, perhaps due to the unreasonably tight sched-
ule dictated. Yet, it quite obviously conflicted with the first in-
sight of BEPS that identified the necessity of enhanced coordi-
nation. Coordination is a problem since it conflicts with the very
nature of our competition-based regime.
As already explained, much of the actual BEPS deliverables,
and clearly the immediate impact of the project, should be at-
tributed to its minimalist view.188 Nonetheless, some of the ac-
tion items individually reflected the maximalist, reform-seeking
view of the project.189 These action items, however, may not have
an immediate impact on the international tax regime and tax
treaties. By design, these action items have mostly been charged
with producing reports, not action plans (no pun intended). One
may interpret this as a signal of the OECD’s disbelief or lack of
interest in comprehensive reform. Yet, it is not unreasonable to
187. Note that this is a desirable development since, if successful (and that
is not certain since all countries observe the actions of the OECD), it would
eventually provide a chance for a new coordination-based rather than compe-
tition-based regime to be established.
188. I.e., the combat of BEPS by the largest MNEs.
189. For example, action items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, and 15. ACTION 1 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 41; ACTION 3 FINALREPORT, supra note 44; ACTION 4 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 106; ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT, supra note 108; ACTION 6
FINALREPORT, supra note 114; ACTION 14 FINALREPORT, supra note 31; ACTION
15 FINAL REPORT, supra note 83.
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acknowledge that the short timeframe of BEPS could not accom-
modate serious reform of this magnitude. This article supports
this latter interpretation and argues that the most significant
contribution of the BEPS project to the international tax regime
will not be in the implementation of the immediate recommen-
dations but rather in the steps made toward comprehensive re-
form. This section substantiates this argument, beginning first
with its most typical and important example: BEPS action item
15.
1. The Multilateral Instrument
The first dramatic achievement of BEPS is its conclusion that
a multilateral tax treaty instrument is not only desirable but
also both legally possible and practically feasible.190 Action item
15 had a limited goal: to explore whether such a conclusion could
be made. Yet, the OECD has gone further, using the power of
inertia to proceed toward the establishment of the instrument in
the post-BEPS era.
The drama here is not so much the actual progress, itself an
unmistakable achievement, but the dismissal of the most com-
mon opposing arguments against multilateral tax arrangement:
that they are legally impossible to construct and clearly impos-
sible to implement. The argument about the limited scope of the
instrument according to the current BEPS project (i.e., the
amendment of multiple tax treaties to conform to some BEPS
norms) is unimportant. It would be senseless to believe that such
an instrument would be abandoned after the countries commit
to an instrument that implements the few BEPS treaty norms
that gained consensus. A multilateral instrument will clearly be
supportive of an international tax forum, even if it is not a con-
dition for the establishment of such forum. This instrument
would give power for such a forum and would incentivize coun-
tries to participate in it.
It is crucial to understand that a multilateral instrument does
not present a death sentence for bilateral tax treaties and the
current regime. One may reasonably claim that it would save
them. Much duplication and waste would be avoided if treaty
negotiation were streamlined. A proper understanding of tax
190. See ACTION 15 FINAL REPORT, supra note 83.
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treaties, not as essential norm makers but rather as comity en-
hancing tools, should make treaties more rather than less effec-
tive.
Finally, a multilateral instrument does not have to develop
into a multilateral tax treaty, at least not of the kind typically
criticized by conservative observers. The all-or-nothing approach
dominated the international tax discourse, dictating a binary
choice between a single all-encompassing supranational multi-
lateral tax treaty that is supposedly promoted by (complete) har-
monization proponents and the current regime that is based on
a large number of bilateral tax treaties. Breaking away from this
approach would permit countries to make progress—including
effective multilateral reforms—without giving up the whole
store. Countries would be able to keep negotiating and would
hold some unique positions in bilateral or other settings, yet they
would not be required to waste efforts and capital over unneces-
sary, non-policy-related matters. These are luxury expenses that
most countries, including the richest, presently cannot afford.
2. Standard Transfer Pricing and CbC Reporting
The second dramatic achievement of BEPS is the standard
transfer-pricing reporting, particularly the CbC reporting
framework. In a striking similarity to the rhetoric on the multi-
lateral instrument previously discussed, the OECD is attempt-
ing to ameliorate the impact of this development. CbC reporting
has been dramatically decimated to a framework and includes
very little reporting that is new, relevant, or useful for BEPS to
counter sophisticated tax authorities. Now, however, such infor-
mation is also available to less sophisticated and less funded au-
thorities. It is also part of the official correspondence of MNEs.
This reporting is useful not only for benevolent tax authorities
that simply could not afford economically or politically to obtain
the needed information to enforce their tax laws but also in cases
where transparency was lacking for other reasons. Now, it would
be difficult for tax authorities to ignore the disturbing num-
bers,191 the exposure of which triggered the BEPS project. One
should not forget that tax authorities did not start the project or
initiate the complaints preceding it. In fact, the project was
forced and compelled by politicians. The tax authorities have
191. See supra note 6.
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long ignored this data, a task that would be very difficult when
it is clearly and uniformly presented to them and too many other
authorities at the same time.192
Even more obvious is the impact on the taxpayers themselves.
MNEs would have to operate much more carefully when such
work papers become mandatory. Collusion between taxpayers
and tax authorities would also be more difficult when the reports
are available to multiple tax authorities. A more realistic view
of these reports reveals a much larger potential impact of these
reports. First, once disseminated, these reports are potentially
exposable, especially with multiple tax authorities involved. Me-
dia, disgruntled whistle-blowers, and litigation come to mind
first in this regard. This makes the stakes much higher for both
tax authorities and taxpayers, and the chance of real success is
significantly more meaningful.
Beyond the information itself, these reports may be influential
in another way. The OECD has strongly emphasized that the
CbC reports in particular may only be used by tax authorities
(being confidential, not publicly available) and only for the pur-
poses of risk assessment in the process of transfer-pricing en-
forcement. This emphasis hides a concern that tax authorities
would apply formulary mechanisms to challenge taxpayers and
deviate from the arm’s length standard. The temptation to take
this route would be that the information is organized and avail-
able in amanner that makes formulary taxation easy and almost
direct. This is interesting at a time where the OECD has prom-
ised to question its devotion to the arm’s length standard and
deviate from it when it does not work. Regardless of the norma-
tive aspects of the issue, it is clear that the OECD here is either
naïve or not genuine. It is not reasonable to request such re-
straint from small, poor tax authorities when they may view it
as the only path they can take to collecting revenue from MNEs.
What is the tax-treaty angle here? Most obviously, the imple-
mentation of the arm’s length standard is presented as part of
tax treaty law, despite the lack of an obvious obligation to that
effect in actual tax treaties. The reporting and the standardiza-
tion would clearly assist the varying transfer-pricing charge of
treaties. Yet, more importantly, the multilateral setting of the
192. See, e.g., Caterpillar’s Offshore Tax Strategy: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs,
113th Cong. (2014).
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reports will necessarily enhance coordination of transfer-pricing
norms and would make it cheaper and seamless in implementa-
tion. A key component here could be the requirement to report a
single set of transfer prices in multiple jurisdictions, which, if at
all, is presently very weak. Tax treaties would be a natural place
to clarify and implement such a norm.193 Note that these ad-
vantages would arise in both a bilateral and a multilateral tax
treaty setting.
3. Dispute Resolution: Is it Left Behind?
The unfinished nature of the progress made in BEPS toward
institutionalization and further centralization of the interna-
tional tax regime is particularly apparent in the project’s pro-
gress on dispute resolution. Dispute resolution is very important
to complete a minimal infrastructure for the regime. Once a mul-
tilateral instrument is implemented, the regime would have a
norm-making procedure as well as imperfect implementation
and reporting powers. The current regime’s dispute resolution
mechanism, however, is lacking and without a robust operation
for resolving disputes. Thus, it is doubtful that the next step to-
ward institutionalization can be made.
Interestingly, the issue here is not the content, as it seems that
there is little opposition to mandatory “baseball” arbitration as
a desired solution (even if alternative mechanisms may be able
to supplement it). The OECD supported this solution even before
BEPS and continues to promote it through action item 14 of the
BEPS action plan. Yet, little progress was made on this matter.
As already mentioned, the pact of a significant group of powerful
countries to commit to mandatory arbitration in all of their tax
treaties is encouraging, yet it is difficult to assess whether even-
tually it would be meaningful and successful.
It is not difficult to observe that the problem here is the dis-
trust among the new partners in the project. Outsourcing adju-
dication may expose some countries’ concessions of tax sover-
eignty, making it politically not feasible to support it even in the
context of BEPS, and especially when OECD is promoting the
193. Indeed, the use of tax treaties, or more specifically the exchange of in-
formation mechanisms in tax treaties, could be the next battleground in the
implementation of these transfer-pricing reporting requirements. The United
States has already expressed its anxiety over the matter. See Alex M. Parker,
Stack: U.S. Would Halt Exchange of Tax Data If Made Public, 24 TAXMGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1291 (2016).
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solution. Such lack of progress is likely to hamper serious pro-
gress toward institutionalization of the international tax regime.
Technically, it is possible to keep the current noncommittal re-
gime, but that would limit its efficacy. Perhaps a better solution
would be to exploit the flexibility of the current regime and step
outside of it for the purposes of dispute resolution. Outside or-
ganizations dominate similar dispute resolution regimes and are
quite effective For example, the European Arbitration Conven-
tion is a separate treaty (and entity) from the European Un-
ion,194 and the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (“ICSID”) is the most common institution used in
arbitration pursuant to the international investment regime.195
There is no reason why trust issues could not be overcome by the
use of different institutions. Tax treaties can clearly accommo-
date such a solution and is evidenced by the treaties that actu-
ally adopted mandatory arbitration. Such a development should
not affect the future of tax treaties beyond the risk of nonaction
on the stability of the whole international tax regime.
C. Principles in a Fog
Some other fundamental norms have taken less clear paths.
Unfortunately, the substantive rules of tax treaties have been
much less successful than their structural aspects. BEPS dealt
with three basic issues related to the substantive rules of the
international tax regime, all of which are strongly embedded in
tax treaties. First, “more” source taxation was required to ap-
pease developing countries. Second, some circumstances were
not effectively regulated, either because of deficient rules or eco-
nomic development not anticipated by the current rules, and
therefore required changes in the norms. Third, unacceptable,
so-called stateless income avoided taxation, which required
194. See Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection
with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, Aug. 20, 1990, 1990
O.J. (L 225) 10 (EC); see also Dirk Schelpe, The Arbitration Convention: Its
Origin, Its Opportunities and Its Weaknesses, 4 EC TAX REV. 68, 70–71 (1995);
Luc Hinnekens, European Arbitration Convention: Thoughts on Its Principles,
Procedures and First Experience, 19 EC TAX REV. 109 (2010).
195. See Sergio Puig, Emergence & Dynamism in International Organiza-
tions: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & International Investment Law, 44
GEO. J. INT’LL. 531, 540 (2012) (discussing the dominance of ICSID in interna-
tional investment law and its challenges).
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changes in the norm in order to subject it to tax jurisdiction. Un-
fortunately, BEPS primarily focuses on the last issue, effectively
abandoning the first two. Ultimately, the unclear principles un-
derlying the international tax regime and the reluctance of coun-
tries to engage in a meaningful discourse over such principles
are at fault. Until such a discussion takes place, reform has no
chance of success.
1. The Single Tax Principle
The appealing single tax principle naturally makes double
non-taxation a corollary to double taxation, the longstanding
core purpose of tax treaties. Yet, presenting these two issues as
mirror images of each other is wrong and harmful, both norma-
tively and practically. The most obvious practical example is the
BEPS work on action item 2, which recommends that certain
countries tax income that they do not wish to tax under their
domestic laws just so that such income does not go untaxed.196
There is no principle-based reason, except for perceived admin-
istrative convenience, to choose these and not other countries.
This solution is very different from the supposedly mirror situa-
tion where both jurisdictions wish to tax a single item of income
and one or both concede part or all of their claims.
The single tax principle ignores the key issue of tax base divi-
sion that is at the core of the BEPS project. The BEPS solutions
do not support a claim by source countries to tax, and sometimes
they do not support their claim not to tax. This is unlikely to
improve the legitimacy of the BEPS project and (by that) its
chances of success. Finally, tax treaties are not really designed
to combat against double non-taxation, except through purpos-
ive interpretation. The attempt to infuse norms of this kind into
treaties is questionable and would interfere with proper inter-
pretation.
2. Source and Residence
Rivers of ink have been poured over the dichotomy between
residence and source taxation and its dominance of the interna-
tional tax discourse. This article does not join this discourse, but
196. These could be countries that use exemption as a method to relieve dou-
ble taxation or countries that grant tax incentives to attract foreign invest-
ment. In any event, the point is that they made policy decisions that they
should not tax in these circumstances. See supra note 60.
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rather raises a question about the utility of this dichotomy and
points to the harm that stubborn insistence of organizing the
whole regime around these concepts may cause.
Take, for example, action item 2. The conflict there is typically
between a residence and source country, although conflicts be-
tween two potential residence countries or source countries also
arise.197 Third-party countries may also be affected. The point is
that two countries independently have legitimate tax jurisdic-
tion as either residence or source countries, yet they apply rules,
legitimate in and of themselves, that fail to result in acceptable
“single” taxation (double non-taxation). The residence/source
rules of the international tax regime were designed to deal pri-
marily with double taxation and its elimination. Hence, their
primary effect is to limit source taxation and then, secondarily,
to relieve double taxation by requiring the residence country to
respect whatever source taxation left is duly collected. Despite
its success over the years, this mechanism has been imperfect,
and much double taxation was left unresolved by it. The OECD
has attempted to improve this by applying unifying standards
for some conflict of qualifications198 and in the partnerships
area,199 for example, yet these attempts are only somewhat suc-
cessful, partly because they are left as guidance external to the
core international tax regime and because they have not enjoyed
a meaningful consensus. Sometimes classifications of residence
or source does not simply mean what it does in the straightfor-
ward, simple cases.200 This is the case with hybrid mismatches.
The rules simply do not fit them. Therefore, it should not have
been surprising that the standards applied by the OECD to re-
solve conflicts, based on principles developed in the course of the
attempt to resolve double taxation, do not fit either. Double non-
taxation was not originally perceived as a problem of the inter-
national tax regime. The creators of the regime who were con-
cerned with overtaxation wanted to ensure free trade and limit
197. Id.
198. OECD COMMENTARIES, supra note 55, art. 1, para. 23.
199. See OECD, supra note 97.
200. This occurs in many different ways, for example: when the universal
source rule refers to residence, such as in the case of dividends or capital gains;
or when the source is arbitrary, such as in many cases of digital products; or
in the various complex circumstances known as triangular cases. See FETT,
supra note 56.
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the powers of overextending government in order to protect in-
vestors and entrepreneurs. Exchange of information was consid-
ered sufficient to protect the tax base of countries. The current
rules, therefore, are unsurprisingly incapable of dealing with
powerful taxpayers who erode such tax bases. Nonetheless, the
OECD and countries in general have acknowledged the problem
of double non-taxation as a mirror problem of double taxation,
and as such have applied supposedly “mirror” rules.
Nevertheless, the source and residence rules have problems
beyond the interaction with the single tax principle. Sometimes
they are difficult to apply to novel circumstances. The obvious
example is the digital economy. It would be ridiculous to source
income generated by that economy and even harder to enforce
rules based on such sourcing.
Similarly, the residence concept does not fare much better, alt-
hough its main problem is not new. BEPS is about corporations
and the corporate tax, and corporations do not “reside” any-
where. Countries assign corporate residence based on various
unconvincing constructs. Yet, eventually, assuming we accept
the corporate fiction or metaphor for tax purposes, the corporate
residence rules are merely technical in the service of general tax
policies.201 Even now at the end of the BEPS project, the OECD
cannot disconnect from the need to have a standard rule for cor-
porate residence (it did get rid of the completely unworkable rule
it previously used).
3. And, of Course: Arm’s Length
Whatever façade the OECD wishes to maintain, its transfer-
pricing norms are not working. The problem is not just in the
implementation or the moral character of practitioners as the
OECD seems to argue. The problem is that the arm’s length
standard is clearly unworkable, particularly for intangibles or
any other difficult cases (yet, awkwardly, this standard has been
elevated to a level of “principle,” as all OECD communications
now use this new semantic that is very ironic in such an unprin-
cipled project202). The OECD already acknowledged it, yet could
201. See, e.g., Marian, supra note 94.
202. For more on this unfortunate action, see Yariv Brauner, Changes?
BEPS, Transfer Pricing for Intangibles, and CCAs, in TRANSFER PRICING IN
BEPS (forthcoming 2016).
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not make the leap forward to reform the rules based on its orig-
inal observation that in some cases “going beyond arm’s length”
is inevitable. The resort to profit splits is not sufficient since the
OECD and governments have insisted for the longest time now
that profit split is arm’s length compatible203 and, therefore,
have constrained the method, inflicting it with many of the de-
fects of the other rules.
Infusing the rules with formulary elements is inevitable in-
deed and will happen regardless of the opposition or the verbal
dress up of the rules. Interestingly, the adoption of CbC report-
ing would, perhaps unintentionally, assist in this process, de-
spite the opposition of the OECD and other conservatives.
Poorer countries are unlikely simply to ignore the potential in
the report for efficient enforcement while they struggle with
costly and convoluted arm’s length enforcement. An honest re-
form would have been much more desirable, efficient, effective,
and just. Ultimately, these are just a few of the most salient ex-
amples of the hurdles that the OECD created by its insistence to
avoid a principled approach to international tax reform and to
stick to traditional concepts without much thought about the im-
plications of such a decision.
D. Can Current Bilateral Tax Treaties Survive Post-BEPS?
If one affirmative conclusion can be made here, it is that tax
treaties would survive post-BEPS and, perhaps, would even con-
tinue to thrive (likely with few changes in the short-term). The
most significant risk that tax treaties face is the dismantling of
the international tax regime. In practice that would occur if
countries decide to abandon tax treaties, likely in favor of uni-
lateral, defensive measures,204 and, perhaps, some looser, mini-
mal arrangements in regions or in political groups.
This, of course, would be in direct contrast to the purpose of
the BEPS project that seeks more rather than less coordination
and even designates such enhanced coordination as necessary
for all of the countries involved in the project. Yet, the immediate
203. See François Vincent, Transfer Pricing and Attribution of Income to Per-
manent Establishments: The Case for Systematic Global Profit Splits (Just
Don’t Say Formulary Apportionment), 53 CAN. TAX J. 409 (2005).
204. This article assumes that the choice of a comprehensive multilateral,
supranational treaty of the WTO sort presently is off the table.
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impact of BEPS, particularly its practical implementations (re-
flecting the minimal view of the project), has been the exact op-
posite. Perversely, many countries chose to preempt BEPS and
unilaterally adopt BEPS-fighting mechanisms through legisla-
tion, regulation, or even just administrative changes of course.205
This is particularly disturbing since perceived leaders of the pro-
ject took some of the most egregious actions. Notably, when the
United Kingdom enacted a “diverted profits tax” and patent box
regime, the former only vaguely resembled BEPS action, and the
latter was enacted during efforts to combat patent box re-
gimes.206
Yet, this should not be too surprising since the OECD’s work
on the practical aspects of BEPS was dominated by the idea of
seeking best practices that would be unilaterally implemented
into law by the various countries involved. At first impression,
this should not surprise since best practices are the ultimate
soft-law mechanism for normative change. Standardization of
the international tax regime is the ultimate goal of the OECD,
and best practices is the quickest mechanism to affect change. It
is more difficult to seek consensus over model treaty amend-
ments and, even then, it can take a long time until actual trea-
ties implement them. Moreover, the focus of the minimal view of
BEPS is that antiabuse and anti-abuse norms are primarily do-
mestic by tradition and through decisions by the OECD, even
when treaties apply. An additional advantage is that best prac-
tices could be presented as deliverables in a short timeframe,
making BEPS a potentially successful project, even if none of the
rules actually carry legal significance at the time success is de-
clared.
As already explained, the normative basis for most of the
BEPS actions is very questionable. At the end of the day, BEPS
delivered a potpourri of anti-abuse rules with essentially no
standards or principles to guide their interpretation and reason-
able implementation. If success means vast implementation by
countries of the various proposed best practices, then BEPS
205. See Amanda Athanasiou, Jumping the Gate on BEPS Unilateral Ac-
tions, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 937 (2015); Stuart Gibson, Jumping the Gun on
BEPS—Is the United States Next?, 78 TAXNOTES INT’L 689 (2015).
206. SeeMindy Herzfeld, The U.K. Embraces Tax Competition and BEPS, 75
TAXNOTES INT’L 85 (2014).
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would necessarily fail to achieve its original promise and pur-
pose: to enhance coordination in the acknowledgment that uni-
lateral action is bound to fail in our interdependent world.
The reality may be even worse. Countries have, as already
said, adopted additional domestic rules in an uncoordinated
manner, even before knowing what the OECD recommendations
would be.207 Such action directly increases mismatches in laws,
it incentivizes retaliation or even less tactical behavior that is
unlikely to follow the strategy eventually provided for by the
OECD, and penalizes the countries that have been most cooper-
ative with the OECD by waiting patiently for its recommenda-
tions. MNEs are also clear losers here, at least in the short-term.
They face less rather than more clarity. Eventually, there may
be more tax-planning opportunities when the fog disappears,
yet, currently, the costs of uncertainty are quite significant. Per-
haps the most worrying trend is the tightening of enforcement
in many countries. Again, this may seem desirable and con-
sistent with BEPS, yet often it is done in an unorganized and
legally questionable manner, and it clearly changes traditions
that may be harmful in the long run. Note that much of these
costs are likely to go to waste and not to the coffers of govern-
ments.
Presently, the magnitude of rogue action does not seem to be
significant enough to collapse the regime. Yet, retaliation and
short-term strategies of countries are likely to weaken rather
than strengthen the regime. A shift of focus to antiabuse is nec-
essarily a shift of focus away from coordination and, subse-
quently, from tax treaties to unilateral domestic measures. Lack
of certainty and weakening of the rule of law, even if just in the
form of reduced standardization as effected by tax treaties,
would obviously diminish the impact of tax treaties and treaty
law on international trade. It may spiral to a complete collapse
of the regime. If this momentum continues post-BEPS, rather
than enhanced coordination and institutionalization, the chance
of survival for the international tax regime and tax treaties will
not be promising.
207. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 200; see also Mindy Herzfeld, A
Looming Global Tax War?, 81 TAXNOTES INT’L 467 (2016).
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CONCLUSION
Tax treaties shall survive BEPS. This article argues that, at
best, the project will likely result in minimal reform of the inter-
national tax regime and its institutions. No one should be happy
with this outcome, except perhaps a few OECD officials, as the
world is now less certain with respect to cross-border invest-
ment, the rule of law becomes less robust, and the fundamental
problem of fair division of tax bases remains unresolved. Yet, the
article points to a silver lining in the dynamics of the BEPS pro-
ject, specifically in the implementation phase. The multilateral
instrument talks—even if not successfully concluded in the
short-term—have effectively disposed of the notion that tax co-
ordination on a global basis is not technically feasible. The pro-
gress on dispute resolution, emphasizing mandatory arbitration,
has proven again that the challenges are not technical but rather
a matter of trust building. And the standardization of transfer-
pricing reporting, likely the most meaningful of all actual re-
forms, provides a roadmap for coordinated and standard tax
rules for the benefit of all. Together, these developments demon-
strate that enhanced coordination, already acknowledged by
most as the sole path for progress on international tax matters,
is possible and beneficial, even if disliked by a few powerful in-
terest groups. Resistance does not stir reform in a different di-
rection but rather simply defers progress, often with grave con-
sequences to most stakeholders.
The article explains the importance of institutional reform and
its impact on the success of coordination-centered reform. It fur-
ther notes that a rushed, political program that is not based on
relatively clear and agreed upon principles cannot succeed, as
clearly demonstrated by BEPS. Ironically, if BEPS followed the
rhetoric it used in its initial stages (coordination, holistic reform,
and innovation), it would have a much better chance of success.
Therefore, future decision makers do not need to "reinvent the
wheel" and will do well to study the BEPS project, its promise,
and its shortcomings in the next "round" that is likely to take
place soon, as the fundamental challenges are too important for
all and have not gone away.
